

Funding Immigrant Organizations: Suburban Free-riding and Local Civic Presence

Els de Graauw, *Baruch College, City University of New York**
Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu

Shannon Gleeson, *University of California, Santa Cruz*
sgleeson@ucsc.edu

Irene Bloemraad, *University of California, Berkeley*
bloemr@berkeley.edu

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Executive Summary

Research and Public Policy Question

When the federal government launched the War on Poverty almost fifty years ago, it sought to improve the situation of poor people and promote the empowerment of marginalized communities. Social policy shifted to a model of public-private partnership where government funding went to local nonprofit organizations to provide services to the disadvantaged. How is this model faring in today's "new geography" of poverty and immigration? Suburban poverty has been growing rapidly in recent decades, as has the number of immigrants living in the United States. Indeed, the changing geography of poverty and immigration are linked: the foreign born are, on average, poorer than U.S.-born citizens, and today half of all immigrants living in metropolitan areas reside in suburbs. Many newcomers have eschewed the traditional immigrant gateway cities, moving to "new" gateway destinations and suburbs. How do suburbs and new gateway cities respond to foreign-born disadvantaged residents? Do their local governments promote public-private partnerships with immigrant-focused organizations that advocate for and provide services to immigrants?

Evidence and Study Design

This is a multi-year study of how four different types of cities in the San Francisco Bay region—a continuous immigrant gateway city (San Francisco), a 21st century immigrant gateway city (San Jose), a large suburban immigrant city (Fremont), and a smaller suburban immigrant city (Mountain View)—support immigrant organizations. We examined how local government officials conceptualize their responsibility to immigrant residents and we assess the financial resources they allocate through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, a legacy of the public-private partnership model launched by the War on Poverty. We draw on extensive fieldwork to compare the four cities, including 142 in-depth interviews with community organization representatives and local government leaders, a database of registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, and government reports of municipal funding allocations for fiscal years 2004-07.

Findings and Explanations

Our research shows significant inequality in public funding for immigrant organizations across the region. Although a greater proportion of residents in the suburban cities of Fremont and Mountain View are foreign-born than in the central cities of San Francisco and San Jose, neither suburb awarded *any* CDBG monies to an immigrant organization in 2004-07. The lack of funding is even more surprising when we consider that the CDBG program targets organizations that serve low- and moderate-income persons. While the two suburban cities have, on average, a lower percentage of poor people than the two central cities, the foreign born make up a *larger* proportion of the poor population in these smaller municipalities. In contrast, the city of San Francisco funded immigrant organizations at proportions in line with the percentage of immigrants living in the city and the proportion of foreign born among the city's poor population. The situation in San Jose stood in-between: San Jose funded some immigrant organizations, but provided less money to fewer organizations than we would expect given the city's demographics.

Understanding Funding Inequalities and Suburban Free-riding

Existing scholarship explains immigrant-directed public-private partnerships through a political exchange model: local officials make rational decisions to fund community organizations to achieve political goals. Not surprisingly, researchers find that migrants who move to a liberal or progressive municipality receive a warmer welcome than those who face anti-immigrant politicians committed to small government and limited public services. We demonstrate, however, that even in a politically progressive place like the Bay Area, public support for immigrant organizations can vary dramatically by locality. Politics, alone, cannot explain public outreach to immigrant groups.

We instead emphasize the importance of immigrant civic infrastructures and officials' taken-for-granted social constructions of legitimate public policy target populations. San Francisco's continuous exposure to immigration over the 20th century, as compared to San Jose's more recent experiences, has produced a vibrant civic infrastructure of immigrant organizations that have the experience, networks, and expectation that they should be partners with city officials. We find that government officials in these two central cities draw on a narrative of the city as an immigrant destination and a history of public-private partnerships to justify including immigrants in social policy.

In comparison, proximity to central cities produces a dynamic of "suburban free-riding" in Fremont and Mountain View. Suburban officials presume that immigrants can rely on the resources and services provided in other jurisdictions, in effect free-riding on the funding that neighboring central cities disperse to immigrant organizations and the services those nonprofits deliver. While suburban officials in a politically progressive region such as the Bay Area celebrate diversity, when it comes to public-private partnerships, they also employ a variety of narrative strategies to rationalize excluding immigrant organizations from funding. In some cases, immigrants appear completely invisible from officials' conceptions of the target population for municipal support, while in many others they are viewed as too transnational, too rich, or too organized to need public support or, conversely, they are perceived as too insular, too small, or too unorganized to want it. Our research suggests that a key obstacle to funding immigrant organizations lies in the fact that immigrants are not seen as sufficiently legitimate interlocutors and civic partners.

Implications

Our findings underscore the importance of a regional lens to questions of nonprofit funding and immigrant integration. Suburban destinations that are located close to a traditional immigrant gateway city can take limited responsibility for foreign-born residents. Geographers, sociologists, and students of urban politics increasingly highlight the rise of "ethnoburbs" and "edge gateways" as a critical frontier for research and public policy, but we show that elected and non-elected government officials in immigrant suburbs have yet to come to terms with their cities' changing demography, even if their political ideology welcomes diversity. Future research on new immigrant destinations must therefore move beyond simple juxtapositions between progressive and anti-immigrant localities. Instead, scholars need to consider how characteristics such as a city's size, immigrant history, and location in a metropolitan region affect the decisions of municipal officials to support the civic infrastructure of immigrant communities.

Future studies should also assess how broadly our findings hold in areas with different immigration histories and regional dynamics. There is evidence that suburban free-riding is

widespread around traditional gateway cities, such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Dynamics might vary, however, in regions where the dominant central city is not a traditional immigrant gateway, such as Washington, D.C. or Atlanta. For welfare state researchers, these findings reinforce arguments about the spatial mismatch between the places where disadvantaged residents live and the distribution of public and private resources for combating poverty. For scholars of immigration, funding disparities support the contention that researchers must distinguish between different types of immigrant-receiving jurisdictions when studying the “new geography” of immigrant settlement.

Introduction

When the U.S. federal government launched the War on Poverty almost fifty years ago, it sought to improve the situation of poor people and promote the empowerment of marginalized communities. Social policy shifted to a model of public-private partnerships where government funding went to local nonprofit organizations and community action agencies to provide services to the disadvantaged, especially African Americans and the urban poor (Grønbjerg 2001; Marwell 2004; Reckhow and Weir 2012). The ongoing privatization and devolution of public services in the 1970s and 1980s further transformed the relationship between public institutions and the nonprofit sector. Local nonprofits became key players in service provision and government funding became an indispensable resource for civil society organizations (Allard 2009; Salamon 1999; Smith and Lipsky 1993). Nonprofits also became advocates (Minkoff 1995; Walker 1991); various scholars argue that contemporary nonprofits are uniquely situated to understand and promote the issues of vulnerable populations (Berry with Arons 2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012; Walker and McCarthy 2010). Given the prevalence and importance of the public-private partnership model—one that provides critical human services and facilitates civic and political voice—which organizations receive government support and why?

We pose this question within the context of a “new geography” of poverty and immigration in the United States. Although the poverty rate has remained high in central cities, suburbs housed a larger number of poor people in 2009, and more than two-thirds of net growth in the poor population from 2000 to 2009 occurred in suburbs (Kneebone 2010: 2; Kneebone and Garr 2010). Renewed immigration has also generated demographic transformations: the foreign-born population grew from just five percent in 1970 to thirteen percent in 2010 (Gibson and Jung 2006; U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Many of these newcomers moved to “new” gateway cities, suburbs, and rural areas rather than traditional immigrant gateways. Indeed, the changing geography of poverty and immigration are linked: the foreign born are, on average, poorer than U.S.-born citizens, and today half of all immigrants living in metropolitan areas reside in suburbs (Singer 2004; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008).¹ How do the new immigrant suburbs and new gateway cities respond to foreign-born disadvantaged groups? Do they promote public-private partnerships with organizations that advocate for and provide human and social services to immigrants?

Existing scholarship tends to explain immigrant-oriented public-private partnerships through a political exchange model, where local government officials make rational decisions to fund community organizations to achieve political goals. Local elected officials provide immigrant organizations with resources in exchange for votes within a modern form of machine politics in New York City (Marwell 2004, 2007). Similarly, community organizations receive support in suburban Washington, D.C. because they solve service delivery problems for bureaucrats and politicians (Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010). These accounts elucidate the mechanisms within particular cases, but provide less purchase on variation between municipalities. Why does exchange not give rise to public-private partnerships for immigrant services everywhere? Comparative research on municipal responses to immigration suggests that partisan ideologies and electoral politics matter (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Wells 2004), as do feelings of threat and anti-immigrant sentiment in local populations (Brettell and Nibbs 2011; Hopkins 2010). Not surprisingly, these studies find that migrants who move to a liberal or progressive municipality receive a warmer welcome than those who face anti-immigrant politicians committed to small government and

limited public services. The political exchange in these studies is presumed to be between elected politicians and native-born voters, with the former enacting policies favored by the latter.

We concur that partisanship and political rationality matter, but we emphasize the importance of government officials' normative and cognitive orientations to help explain the presence or absence of immigrant-oriented public-private partnerships. Taken-for-granted notions of deservingness and legitimacy affect decisions about funding allocations. These in turn rest on the institutional scaffolding and historical legacy of immigrant settlement, which strengthen government officials' awareness of and inclusive orientations towards immigrants. A tradition of immigrant settlement also generates civic infrastructures that facilitate partnerships, especially in larger cities with more developed bureaucratic structures, rendering immigrants a legitimate and natural part of public service provision, grants-making, and advocacy. Taken together, legitimacy and civic infrastructure provide immigrants in traditional gateway cities with more civic presence and a more supportive environment for public-private partnerships compared to those in new gateway cities or immigrant suburbs. This is the case even in destinations characterized by progressive politics and a pro-immigrant environment, and it occurs despite the fact that rapid demographic growth can provide new gateway cities and immigrant suburbs with expanding fiscal resources.

In elaborating this approach, we underscore the importance of a regional lens. Regions are key to research on economic growth, environmental issues, transportation systems, and advocacy for social equity (Gans 2009; Pastor, Lester, and Scoggins 2009; Weir et al. 2012). We find that geographic proximity is fundamental to understanding public-private partnerships targeting immigrant communities, especially when there is a disjuncture between perceptions of where immigrants live—commonly an image of ethnic neighborhoods in a traditional gateway city—and where immigrants actually settle. Political jurisdictions matter—community organizations and public funding decisions are located within politically-delineated spaces—but they must be understood within the context of metropolitan areas. Suburbs' proximity to central cities influences suburban officials' assessment of immigrant communities' local needs and bolsters their decisions to not fund immigrant organizations; they instead presume that immigrants can rely on the resources and services provided in other jurisdictions. We conceptualize this dynamic as “suburban free-riding.”

Thus, while we agree that suburbs are not devoid of civic capacity (Oliver 2001), and that some might engage in the bureaucratic incorporation of immigrants (Jones-Correa 2006, 2008), we emphasize that suburban destinations take limited responsibility for foreign-born residents, particularly when located close to a traditional immigrant gateway city. To a significant degree, both elected and non-elected officials do not internalize the “new geography” of immigrant settlement. Instead, they often view immigrant claims-making and service delivery as something that happens in big cities, not in the places where most immigrants now live.

Our arguments draw from a multi-year study of how four different types of cities—a continuous immigrant gateway city (San Francisco), a 21st century immigrant gateway city (San Jose), a large suburban immigrant city (Fremont), and a smaller suburban immigrant city (Mountain View)—support immigrant organizations. We draw on extensive fieldwork including in-depth interviews with 142 individuals, a database of registered nonprofit organizations, and government reports of municipal funding allocations to compare these four cities, all located in the San Francisco Bay region. We examine how local government officials conceptualize their responsibility to immigrant residents and we assess the financial resources they allocate through

the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, a legacy of the public-private partnership model launched by the War on Poverty.

In what follows, we first describe how public-private partnerships that serve poor and disadvantaged populations have changed over time. We then theorize how place matters in explaining contemporary variation in public funding for immigrant services. After outlining our research design and data sources, we document significant inequality in resource allocation across municipalities within the same region. To understand these findings, we elaborate the dynamic of suburban free-riding and discuss how historical legacies of immigrant settlement influence civic infrastructures and local officials' constructions of immigrants as legitimate target populations of public policy. We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings and consider whether they might hold for other metropolitan regions.

Funding Social Services across Place and Time

Attention to place is critical to understanding public-private partnerships that target disadvantaged groups: the poor tend to be concentrated in particular areas, community organizations operate in specific physical locations, and funding allocations are usually made within circumscribed political jurisdictions. For example, since 1974, when the CDBG program consolidated seven existing federal assistance programs, local officials in disadvantaged areas receive federal monies based on local needs within their jurisdictions. With the significant cuts to social assistance brought on by welfare reform in 1996—the number of people receiving direct assistance plummeted from an all-time high of 14.2 million in 1994 to 3.8 million by 2008 (Danziger 2010: 528)—poor people grew even more reliant on community organizations for assistance, from food security to help find employment (Allard 2009). Beyond direct services, community organizations also affect disadvantaged residents' social ties, information flows, and access to other resources (Small 2006, 2009). Given the significant growth of poverty in U.S. suburbs, this has created a spatial mismatch between traditional service providers located in central cities and the places where more and more poor people live (Allard 2009; Panchok-Berry, Rivas, and Murphy 2011; Puentes and Warren 2006; Reckhow and Weir 2012).

Immigrants with limited means face multiple disadvantages. Data from the American Community Survey indicate that 14.8 percent of native-born Americans lived in poverty in 2010, compared to 18.8 percent of the foreign born and a staggering 25.1 percent of non-citizen immigrants.² Yet many immigrants are barred from direct cash assistance and many face barriers accessing public institutions or nonprofit organizations set up for English-speaking native-born citizens. Furthermore, the United States, unlike many other Western countries, does not have a federal immigrant integration policy, but rather an uncoordinated patchwork of programs spread across multiple levels of government that exists within an overall laissez-faire approach to immigrant settlement (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012; GAO 2011). Immigrants must consequently fall back on family, co-ethnic networks, and community organizations for social assistance and human services.

Historically, immigrant gateway cities like New York, Chicago, and Boston housed the majority of immigrants and the organizations that served them. Urban immigrants received social services, a civic education, and political inclusion from ethnic mutual aid societies (Beito 2000), religious institutions (Dolan 1975; Tentler 1997), local labor unions (La Luz and Fin 1998; Sterne 2001), settlement houses (Davis 1984; Trolander 1987), and political machines (Dahl 1961; Wolfinger 1972). Consonant with ecological models of spatial assimilation (Massey 1985; Park 1926), movement to the suburbs—which correlated with greater English ability,

longer U.S. residence, and more socioeconomic resources (Alba et al. 1999; Iceland and Nelson 2008; Wright, Ellis, and Parks 2005)—meant a reduced need for social and human services and diminished interest in immigrant organizations catering to linguistic and cultural differences.

Today, the image of the traditional gateway city with its institutionally complete ethnic neighborhoods does not reflect the totality of immigrant settlement. Immigrants are moving directly to new gateway cities and suburbs, avoiding traditional gateway cities altogether (Frey 2006; Jones-Correa 2006; Singer 2004). Already in 1980, scholars noted that the historic link between immigration and inner-city neighborhoods was breaking down: while two-thirds of non-Hispanic whites residing in metropolitan areas lived in suburbs, so did about half of Koreans, Filipinos, Asian Indians, and Cubans—the vast majority of whom were foreign-born (Alba and Logan 1991). In 2005, 96 percent of all foreign-born residents in the United States lived in a metropolitan area and well over half of these immigrants resided in suburbs (Singer 2008: 7, 15), giving rise to terms such as “ethnoburbs” and “edge gateways” (Li 1998; Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002; Price and Singer 2008; Zhou 2008).³

The new gateway cities and immigrant suburbs are home to large numbers of people who face some of the same linguistic, economic, social, and cultural challenges that made urban organizations so important to European newcomers a century ago. Contemporary immigrant organizations provide social services (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Marwell 2004, 2007), fight labor law violations (Gleeson 2008; Martin 2012), express identities through cultural, religious, and other activities (Kasinitz 1992; Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008), advocate for public policies that benefit immigrants (de Graauw 2008, 2012), and promote civic and political incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012; Gleeson 2008; de Graauw 2012; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; Saito 1998). The bridging work of community organizations, long a hallmark of immigrant integration, becomes even more critical given government retrenchment, welfare state privatization, the absence of a national integration policy, and the elusive goal of federal immigration reform.

Today’s landscape of charitable service provision is, however, very different from a century ago. Not only is there an increasing spatial mismatch between traditional service organizations and the new geography of immigration, but nonprofit service provision is much more entrenched in public-private partnerships. By 1997, after more than two decades of privatization and devolution, just over half of federal, state, and local government funds for social services went to nonprofits (Salamon 2003). A survey of large human service nonprofits found that government funding accounts for over 65 percent of total revenue, and 60 percent of organizations with government funding report that these monies are their largest source of income (Boris et al. 2010: vii). Among the limited studies reporting financial data for large immigrant-serving nonprofits, we find similar reliance on public funding (Bloemraad 2005; Cordero-Guzmán 2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012). Given that public-private partnerships have become integral to the American welfare state and advocacy efforts for marginalized groups, do municipalities provide immigrant organizations with an equitable share of public resources? If there are differences between municipalities, what accounts for them?

Theorizing How Place Matters

Recent accounts of public-private partnerships with immigrant communities focus on a political exchange model. Elected and non-elected local government officials make rational and strategic decisions to fund immigrant organizations to achieve their preferred political goals. Studying social service provision in eight community organizations in New York City, Marwell (2004,

2007) identifies a new form of machine politics. In a process of triadic exchange, elected city officials provide a community organization with patronage resources via government contracts, the community group provides patronage jobs and services to those who support particular elected officials, and residents of the community provide votes to political incumbents. One implication of this model is that organizations that fail to provide votes might not receive funding. Yet only one of Marwell's eight organizations engaged in machine politics, which suggests that community organizations can access resources in other ways. This is important because electoral mechanisms are problematic for immigrants, only 44 percent of whom had acquired U.S. citizenship and the right to vote in 2010.

Frasure and Jones-Correa (2010) offer a similar model, though one that draws our attention to the key role of non-elected rather than elected officials. Their exchange model builds on a study of day labor centers, which mostly cater to non-citizen migrants, in new immigrant suburbs ringing Washington, D.C. They underscore the role of local bureaucrats who wish to provide assistance to immigrant residents, but lack fiscal resources or service abilities. Bureaucrats thus work with community organizations that deliver services and act as linguistic and cultural brokers. Together, community organizations and local bureaucrats get elected officials to go along because it allows politicians to leverage limited funds by off-loading human and social service work to nonprofit and voluntary organizations. Given that both elected and non-elected officials influence how CDBG grants are distributed among local community groups (Drommel 1980; Kettl 1979; Lovell 1983; Nathan et al. 1977; Rich 1993; Rimmerman 1985), immigrant-oriented public-private partnerships involve a variety of public officials.

Yet the political exchange model leaves some important questions unanswered, including how to explain variation in public support for immigrant services across different types of municipalities. Studies of municipal variation have centered mainly on anti-immigrant policy making. If we consider city decisions to fund immigrant organizations as a signal that local officials recognize immigrants as legitimate community members who are entitled to share in the community's scarce resources, then conversely, proposing and passing anti-immigrant legislation denies immigrant residents' legitimacy and access to public resources. Considered thus, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) find that political factors—especially the partisanship of local residents—matter more than demographic or economic factors in explaining why some municipalities propose and pass anti-immigrant ordinances while others do the opposite. Hopkins (2010) contends that when national anti-immigrant rhetoric is politicized into feelings of threat at the local level, demographic changes increase the probability of anti-immigrant ordinances. Both arguments focus on the political exchange by which elected officials propose policies in return for votes by partisan supporters.

We find it entirely plausible that public-private partnerships are more prevalent in municipalities that are politically progressive, where immigrants make up a non-trivial proportion of the voting population, and where public opinion is favorably disposed toward immigrants. These elements characterize most of the cities and suburbs that ring the San Francisco Bay, including the four we studied. Yet, as we demonstrate below, there is still significant variation between Bay Area localities in their support for immigrant organizations and in how they view disadvantaged immigrant communities. This suggests the need for models that go beyond political exchange and partisan explanations.

We attempt to do so by focusing on what Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008: 20) call civic presence, especially immigrants' visibility and legitimacy, and the dynamics that lead public officials to identify immigrants as legitimate targets of public policy and partners with

local government. In focusing on legitimacy, we draw on Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory of the social construction of target populations in public policy. Such constructions employ explicit and implicit normative characterizations of a particular group that communicate who is deserving of public attention, what government should do for the group, and the appropriate participatory patterns for the group (Schneider and Ingram 1993: 334). Attention to rationales and officials' underlying assumptions elucidates such social constructions, which helps explain why some groups are advantaged over others, independent of traditional measures of political power or seemingly objective evaluations of need (Schneider and Sidney 2009: 105).⁴ This approach seems particularly fruitful for studying immigrant populations, which in political discourse are simultaneously demonized as law breakers, welfare abusers, job stealers, and national security threats (Chavez 2008; Fix 2009; Martinez, Jr. and Valenzuela, Jr. 2006; Newton 2008; Santa Ana 2002) and valorized as hard workers, future citizens, and freedom fighters (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). We do not focus on only one group of immigrants, but rather on their general designation as a constituency with needs that can be appropriately served by public-private partnerships through initiatives such as the CDBG program.

We also examine how the infrastructure of immigrant organizations feeds into social constructions of legitimacy. Robust civic infrastructures facilitate immigrants' ability to establish a track-record of service and advocacy that elected and non-elected city officials can draw upon in defining target populations and defending funding allocations (de Graauw 2008, 2012; Gleeson 2009; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). Drawing from organizational and social movement theories, Walker and McCarthy (2010: 318) posit that the judgments of outside institutions and authorities, or what they term an organization's sociopolitical legitimacy, can facilitate resource acquisition. Civic presence, legitimacy, and institutional infrastructures help generate propositions about how different types of localities will react to low- and moderate-income immigrant residents.

Continuous Immigrant Gateways and the Legacies of History

Building on the work of Singer and colleagues (Singer 2004; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008), we identify three types of settlement communities germane for our study. They are distinguished by a locality's historical experience with immigrant settlement, its size, and its contemporary experience with immigration. First, there are the large central cities that are *continuous immigrant gateways*, such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. These cities have had large immigrant populations for more than a century at proportions far above the national average. A second category is the *21st century gateways*, such as Atlanta, Washington, D.C., and San Jose. These large cities have emerged as major immigrant destinations over the last few decades as their immigrant populations tripled or quadrupled in size (Singer 2008: 8-9). A third type, *suburban immigrant communities*, are like the 21st century gateways in that their experience with migration is recent and characterized by dramatic increases in the proportion of immigrants. However, they differ in their absolute size, with many fewer residents, less diverse economies, and correspondingly smaller and less complex government bureaucracies.

We posit that a sustained experience with migration facilitates the creation and reinforcement of norms that immigrants are legitimate target populations of policy and public-private partnerships. This does not mean that immigrants are uniformly welcomed—indeed, residents can challenge whether public resources should go to them—but it does mean that immigrants are a natural part of city services and decision-making. Officials and residents have long experience with migration and even if “new” immigrants may not be welcomed as readily

as “older” groups, the city’s history provides discursive structures and established claims-making frames upon which new groups can make appeals. Similarly, the legacy of continuous migration builds up a civic infrastructure of immigrant organizations that have relations with city officials and other civil society actors. In continuous gateways, the expansion of public-private partnerships ushered in during the 1960s included disadvantaged immigrant populations.⁵ In contrast, immigrants in 21st century gateways and suburbs must establish new institutional infrastructures and they must gain legitimacy and civic presence in the eyes of elected and non-elected city officials.

Regional Dynamics and Suburban Free-riding

Suburbs have long been considered the bastion of middle-class white residents who seek to escape urban social problems and redistributive tax systems (Gainsborough 2001; Jones-Correa 2006; Oliver 2001). A traditional way of viewing suburban-central city dynamics is through the concept of parasitic suburbs. Suburban residents free-ride on the services, cultural vitality, and economic opportunities of the racially and socioeconomically diverse central city, but they do not pay fully for those benefits since their property taxes go to maintenance services and suburban school systems, rather than redistribution and social services (Hill 1974; Oliver 2001).

We speculate that an analogous process of suburban free-riding can occur with immigrant services. However, unlike the older literature which pits residents of different urban jurisdictions against each other, immigrant free-riding places the needs of some suburban residents, often longstanding native-born citizens, over those of immigrant newcomers. The privileging of non-immigrant residents might be done consciously due to anti-immigrant animus, political ideology, or for electoral gain, as noted earlier. But free-riding might also occur less intentionally in politically progressive or moderate places. We speculate that in the latter case, immigrant groups are simply not seen as a significant part of the civic landscape: they are not within the realm of priorities that officials consider when funding public-private partnerships, or officials provide rationales to elide immigrants’ needs. In new destinations, and especially suburbs, this occurs because immigrants lack the built-up institutional structures and policy legitimacy enjoyed by migrants in continuous gateway cities. In fact, suburban immigrants might face problems precisely because of their proximity to traditional gateways. In such regions, suburban officials have a hard time conceiving of their communities as destinations for immigrant populations with unmet needs, even if demographic data make that clear.

The attraction of free-riding also rests on the reality of limited public funds and the many demands for services faced by public officials. Suburbs have smaller budgets and smaller staffs than their big city neighbors. The sheer number of immigrants in central cities can generate economies of scale, allowing immigrant organizations to better advocate for and offer services to immigrant residents (de Graauw 2008, 2012; Marwell 2004, 2007). The potential fiscal benefits of size should not be overblown, however, since central cities increasingly confront large budget deficits and the number of demands made on the complex bureaucracies of central cities can be a liability, especially since immigrants can be singled out for funding cuts during periods of severe budgetary strain (Katz 1990). But we posit that in general, central cities’ greater size generates a larger funding pot that city officials can allocate to more groups, including immigrant organizations, and it allows for a larger, more professional city bureaucracy with the capacity to develop relationships with nonprofit organizations (de Graauw 2012; Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005). This would suggest that 21st century gateways will move more quickly to extend public-

private partnerships to immigrants than suburbs, even though both are new to dealing with foreign-born populations.

A Regional Research Design: Central Cities and Suburbs in the Bay Area

To investigate how different types of cities respond to immigrants' services needs, we draw on two comparisons. First, we compare a continuous immigrant gateway city, San Francisco, to a 21st century gateway, San Jose. Second, we compare the two central cities with two suburban cities, Fremont and Mountain View, all located in the San Francisco Bay region of California. Our approach resembles other comparative case studies that include new immigrant destinations (Andersen 2010; Donato, Stainback, and Bankston III 2005; Marrow 2011; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008), but an important novelty is that our cities lie in the same region. This allows us to uncover how history, city size, and regional proximity matter for legitimacy, civic infrastructure, and public-private partnerships, while controlling for the proportion of immigrants, the ideological bent of public officials, and the regional economy.⁶ Political ideology, in particular, might complicate comparisons between different types of municipalities, as early evidence suggests that public-private partnerships are more extensive where local elected officials hold a liberal or progressive ideology (de Graauw 2008, 2012; Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005).⁷

[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]

Table 1 provides a demographic overview of the four cities, while Figure 1 provides a visual representation.⁸ San Francisco is a densely populated central city with 757,604 residents concentrated on 49 square miles of land. San Jose is a sprawling city of 898,901 residents across 174 square miles. Fremont is a large suburban city, with a population of 208,455, located on the east side of the San Francisco Bay. Mountain View is a smaller suburban city of 71,153 between San Francisco and San Jose. Both are relatively well-off suburbs, but with pockets of significant poverty—what Panchok-Berry, Rivas, and Murphy (2011) have labeled overshadowed suburbs.⁹ All four cities are Democratic strongholds: voters overwhelmingly voted for Democratic candidates in the last two presidential elections. All four cities have at least one local elected official who belongs to an ethnic or racial minority group other than African Americans. They also all have hourglass economies with job growth concentrated at the top (high-paying professional and managerial jobs) and at the bottom (low-paying services jobs). More than a third of each city's population is foreign-born, ranging from 36 percent in San Francisco to 43 percent in Fremont. As Figure 1 makes clear, almost all census tracts in the region house a far higher percentage of foreign-born residents than the national average (12 percent), and in many the proportion is three or four times greater. More than a fifth of each city's residents speak English "less than very well." Compared to their incidence in the general population, immigrants make up a larger share of the poor population in all four cities, and the children of immigrants—those with at least one foreign-born parent—constitute a dramatically higher proportion of young people living in disadvantaged households than children with two native-born parents. Whether in suburbs or central cities, immigrants face social and human services needs based on socioeconomic condition as well as immigrant-specific needs due to linguistic isolation, precarious legal status, or other migration-specific factors.

Continuous Gateway City: San Francisco

A good deal of immigration research has centered on historic gateways such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Yet San Francisco's status as a continuous gateway city is

undisputable. Incorporated in 1850, 29 percent of San Francisco's 507,000 residents were foreign-born in 1920 (Gibson and Jung 2006).¹⁰ When the foreign-born population in the United States dipped below five percent in the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants made up 19.3 percent of the city population in 1960, climbing to 21.6 percent in 1970. By 2006, 36 percent of city residents were born outside the United States, compared to 12.5 percent nationwide. The largest proportion, 62 percent, hail from Asia, while 21 and 14 percent, respectively, were born in Latin America and Europe. Almost a fifth are recent migrants who moved to the United States in the prior six years. Immigrants in San Francisco are somewhat more likely to be naturalized citizens—62 percent—and, perhaps surprisingly, the city's foreign-born population makes up a somewhat smaller proportion of all those living in poverty, at 39 percent, than in the other three cities. However, as in the other cities, the proportion of foreign born among the city's overall poor population is greater than the percentage of immigrants in the general population. Moreover, children living with one or more immigrant parents constitute an astounding 73 percent of all young people living in disadvantaged households.¹¹

San Francisco embraces a narrative as a city of immigration, not the least because famous neighborhoods like Chinatown, the Mission, Japantown, and North Beach are important tourist destinations. Reminiscent of neighborhoods in New York and Chicago, San Francisco's immigrant groups have recognizable turfs (Pamuk 2004). The city has adopted legislation of symbolic value to immigrant communities, including naming newer ethnic neighborhoods like "Little Saigon," and it has passed legislation of substantive importance, such as declaring itself a "sanctuary city" for undocumented immigrants in 1986 and adopting language access legislation in 2001 (de Graauw 2008, 2012). Unlike the other cities we examine, San Francisco has two municipal agencies with specific immigrant-related mandates: the Immigrant Rights Commission, established by ordinance in 1997, and the Office of Civic Engagement and Immigrant Affairs, which in 2009 consolidated a handful of city offices and administrative positions responsible for implementing immigrant integration programs. In fiscal year 2005-06, San Francisco's operating budget was \$5.3 billion. Despite the legacy of immigration, in 2006, only one of the eleven city legislators was Chinese American and one was Latino.¹²

21st Century Gateway City: San Jose

San Jose was also incorporated in 1850, but it is a 21st century immigrant gateway. In 1920, San Jose was a small regional center, with less than 40,000 residents. Although roughly 21 percent of residents were foreign-born in 1920, migration was transitory and not sustained. By the 1960s, the proportion of immigrants had declined to just 8 percent (Gibson and Jung 2006). A turning point came when San Jose's economy, previously centered on farming, food processing, and distribution, transformed to become the high tech capital of Silicon Valley. In 2006, San Jose was the Bay Area's largest city with a population of almost 900,000. Immigration fueled part of the dramatic growth: by 2006, 39 percent of San Jose residents were immigrants, with 58 percent from Asia and 34 percent from Latin America. As in San Francisco, about a fifth are recent migrants, and despite images of Silicon Valley wealth, over 90,000 city residents live in poverty. Of these individuals, 42 percent are foreign-born, a greater proportion than in San Francisco and greater than the proportion of immigrants in the general population. Seventy-one percent of children in disadvantaged households have at least one immigrant parent.

San Jose officials usually promote pro-immigrant positions, as when city council passed a unanimous resolution in 2007 reaffirming the police department's policy not to arrest persons merely due to unauthorized status (San Jose City Council 2007). The bureaucratic infrastructure

directed at immigrant residents is, however, less developed than in San Francisco, reflecting the city's 21st century gateway designation. San Jose's Strong Neighborhood Initiative, established in 2002, works with many immigrant organizations to foster civic engagement (City of San Jose 2009), but no city agency is specifically dedicated to immigrant affairs. In fiscal year 2005-06, San Jose's operating budget was \$2.7 billion. Two of the ten city councilors were Latino, as was Mayor Ron Gonzales, and one councilor was Vietnamese American.

Large Suburban City: Fremont

Fremont lies east of San Jose, at one end of the region's major transit line. Incorporated in 1956 after five small communities amalgamated, its population stood at 44,000 in 1960, only five percent of which was foreign-born (ABAG 2011). When Portuguese immigrants came to the city as dairy farmers in the 1960s, they were greeted by orchards. In the 1990s, the city went high-tech, attracting high-skilled migrants. The city experienced significant economic and population growth, though not on the scale of neighboring San Jose. Although Fremont is the largest suburb in the region, it has a similar feel to other Bay Area suburbs. More than one city official emphasized, as a city staff person did during an interview, that Fremont is "largely a bedroom community," perceived as qualitatively different from the big cities ringing the Bay.

By 2006, Fremont was home to about 208,000 residents, 43 percent born in another country. Fremont has the highest proportion of Asian migrants (76 percent) of the four cities in our study while 15 percent of the foreign born have origins in Latin America. As in San Jose and San Francisco, about a fifth of Fremont's immigrants are recent arrivals and a bit over half (53 percent) are naturalized citizens. Fremont's foreign born have the highest median incomes of all four cities and the incidence of poverty in the city is relatively low. Nevertheless, of those who do live in poverty, almost half (48 percent) are immigrants. Among children in disadvantaged households, 72 percent have at least one immigrant parent. Thus, while the proportion and number of people living in poverty is lower than in central cities such as San Jose and San Francisco, among Fremont's poor, immigrants are hit hard. They constitute a greater proportion of the poor population than their share of the general population, and a higher proportion of poor residents than in San Francisco or San Jose.

Fremont resembles San Jose in its symbolic support for immigrants, but limited infrastructure for dealing with immigrant integration. Fremont lacks an agency dedicated to immigrant affairs, and its Office of Neighborhoods—which worked extensively to promote civic engagement among low-wage and immigrant communities—was defunded in 2005 under budget pressures. In fiscal year 2005-06, Fremont's operating budget was \$233 million. Two city councilors were Asian American in 2006, one with origins in India and one of Chinese background.

Small Suburban City: Mountain View

Mountain View, also situated on a major regional transit line, lies 35 miles south of San Francisco and 10 miles north of San Jose, across the Bay from Fremont. The city was incorporated in 1902 with barely 600 residents. By mid-century, the population stood at 6,548, with only 9 percent born outside the United States (ABAG 2011). As in San Jose and Fremont, the second half of the 20th century brought demographic growth and economic transformation. Several high-tech giants have offices in Mountain View and the city is home to a former naval facility that now serves as a NASA research site. Population growth has been more muted than in San Jose or Fremont—in 2006, the population was a bit over 71,000 residents—but

immigration is as significant. In 2006, 40 percent of Mountain View residents were foreign-born. Of these, 45 percent had origins in Asia, 33 percent in Latin America, and 17 percent in Europe. Slightly more of these migrants are recent—30 percent entered the country since 2000—and fewer are naturalized citizens, 35 percent. The proportion of immigrants among residents living in poverty is the highest among the four cities, at 53 percent, as is the proportion of children living in disadvantaged families with at least one immigrant parent, 81 percent. Mountain View is thus a suburb with a significant immigrant presence, many of whom have urgent human and social services needs.

Like San Jose and Fremont, Mountain View lacks a municipal office dedicated to immigrant affairs, relying instead on the leadership of its sole Latina councilwoman and the work of the Human Relations Commission. Analogous to some of the D.C. suburbs studied by Frasure and Jones-Correa (2010), Mountain View has allowed the establishment of a day labor center, the only one of its kind in the South Bay. Beyond facilitating employment, the center mobilized the Latino community for a large immigrant rights march in 2006 (Tanenbaum 2006). In fiscal year 2005-06, Mountain View's operating budget was \$193 million.

Data and Methods

We rely on four data sources: 1) funding data on each city's allocation of grants to community organizations through Community Development Block Grants; 2) a database of 6,828 formally registered nonprofit organizations in the four cities; 3) 142 in-depth interviews with elected and appointed city officials, leaders of community organizations, and immigrant advocates; and 4) documentary information from local governments, immigrant organizations, and local ethnic and mainstream media.

Community Development Block Grants

Our primary outcome indicator is allocations from Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) over three fiscal years, 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07, as reported in Consolidated Annual Performance and Evaluation Reports. The CDBG program, which dates from 1974, is one of the longest running programs of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It provides federal grants on a formula basis for community development activities, including direct service provision to low- and moderate-income persons, affordable housing, and infrastructure improvements. The focus is on disadvantaged groups: under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, governments must document that a majority of the funding targets low- and moderate-income areas (Handley 2008). Unlike categorical grants that must be spent for specific purposes, eligible governments have discretion over CDBG allocations. Most funds are dispersed among community organizations, which apply through a competitive grants process. If successful, they must spend CDBG monies on programming in the city where funding is received.¹³ In the spirit of the original public-private partnership model of the 1960s, since 1978, HUD has required jurisdictions receiving CDBG entitlements to submit a Citizen Participation Plan to document efforts at public engagement (Handley and Howell-Moroney 2010).¹⁴

The CDBG program is the largest source of discretionary federal aid awarded to local governments and the amount of money involved is substantial (Brooks and Phillips 2010). In 2006, during our fieldwork, the federal government allocated \$3.7 billion to formula grants (Boyd 2011: 13). Among localities receiving grants, CDBG monies constituted 1.6 percent of total spending (Brooks and Phillips 2008: 253). Contrary to the expectations of some economists

who predicted that cities would reduce taxes by the same amount as the federal grants received, cities that received CDBG funds increased total expenditures by \$0.77 on every dollar of grant money (Brooks and Phillips 2008: 246). This represents real resources for disadvantaged groups.

Receiving a CDBG grant can also have spill-over effects. Nonprofits often find that winning one type of grant facilitates further fundraising and increases the probability of future resources (Panchok-Berry, Rivas, and Murphy 2011). Large human and social service nonprofits hold an average of six government contracts and grants per organization, with a median of three distinct grants or contracts (Boris et al. 2010). Receiving public funds thus breeds a virtuous revenue circle for many organizations, meaning that CDBG allocations provide some indication of broader patterns of public support, or exclusion.

CDBG allocations have been used by other researchers as a measure of local public policy responsiveness and resource allocation to racial minority populations (Hero 1990; Rich 1993), including in Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's (1984) classic study of the San Francisco Bay Area. We believe that this strategy can be usefully extended to comparisons of central cities and suburban communities with large immigrant populations and concentrated pockets of poverty. CDBG allocations are available to large and small cities—our four cities have received CDBG funds for over 30 years—and grants may go to different types of community organizations, including those serving immigrants. On many fronts, central cities and suburbs are hard to compare, but because of the terms of CDBG funding, it provides a useful comparative metric of public-private partnerships. We compare the proportion of CDBG funding received by immigrant organizations to the share of immigrants in the city's population.

Nonprofit Organizations and Civic Capacity

It is difficult, however, for localities to support immigrant organizations if few such organizations exist and immigrant civic capacity is low. To receive CDBG funding, organizations must be officially registered as 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations. We thus take immigrant civil society into account using a National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database of all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).¹⁵ Based on the address provided to the IRS, we identified 6,828 organizations with 501(c)(3) status across the four cities. We coded each organization as primarily an immigrant organization or not. We define immigrant organizations as nonprofits whose mission is to serve or advocate on behalf of one or more immigrant-origin communities, promote their cultural heritage, or engage in transnational relations with the country of origin. Designation as an immigrant organization was based on cues in the organization's name, information in the group's mission statement, in-depth interviews, media statements, web descriptions, and other documentary sources, including local directories of human service agencies.¹⁶ In total, we counted 1,151 immigrant organizations, 17 percent of all registered nonprofits, a much smaller share than immigrants' 38 percent of the population in the four cities. This finding corroborates other studies documenting immigrants' under-representation in the nonprofit sector (Cortés 1998; Gleeson and Bloemraad 2012; Hung 2007; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008).

We focus on immigrant organizations because although some mainstream organizations serve disadvantaged immigrants, their services often have inadequate language services or do not provide assistance especially germane to immigrant residents, such as translation services, culturally appropriate human services, or immigrant-related legal services. As others have argued, and our field work shows, immigrant organizations are overwhelmingly community-

based organizations that specialize in serving low-income and limited-English proficient residents (Cordero-Guzman 2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012; Martin 2012; Stepick, Stepick, and Kretsedemas 2001; Zhou 2008). Immigrant organizations thus fill a niche in service delivery, and many go beyond services to build immigrants' civic skills and leadership potential and to advocate for their rights with local policymakers (Bloemraad 2006; de Graauw 2008, 2012; Gleeson 2008), activities in line with the community empowerment models that animated early public-private partnerships under the War on Poverty.¹⁷

Interviews and Archival Evidence

To put the funding allocations in context, we culled through hundreds of pages of city and federal documents to trace the CDBG allocation process and better understand interactions between immigrant organizations and city officials. These sources included materials such as the CDBG Consolidated Plans of each city and reports of public hearings. Strikingly, while the CDBG program has been around for decades, and all our cities have long histories of receiving funds, formal reporting on the grants-making process is limited and far from transparent, perhaps because city officials wish to mitigate negative reactions among those not funded. Indeed, none of the four cities we studied disclosed information on the organizations that applied but failed to receive CDBG funding, despite numerous inquiries to a broad range of individuals. We were consequently forced to rely on lists of successful grantees from public documents and requests for information.

We also conducted 142 in-depth interviews between 2004 and 2008. These interviews probed local officials' sense of responsibility to immigrant communities and immigrant organizations' view of their relationship with city officials.¹⁸ We interviewed at least one city council member in each city, as well as representatives of local school boards and the chairs of various boards and commissions that work with immigrants (e.g., Human Relations Commissions in Fremont and Mountain View and the Immigrant Rights Commission in San Francisco). We also spoke to city staff, including those working in the Santa Clara County Office of Human Relations, the San Jose Strong Neighborhood Initiative, and the San Francisco Office of Civic Engagement and Immigrant Affairs. Among immigrant organizations, we interviewed the executive director or someone knowledgeable about the history and activities of the organization. Interviews lasted an average of one to two hours and followed a semi-structured format.

Findings: City Funding and Immigrant Organizations

Immigrants increasingly live in suburbs, but these new destinations are slow to respond to their foreign-born residents. As Table 1 showed, a greater proportion of residents in the suburban cities of Fremont and Mountain View are foreign-born than in the central cities of San Francisco and San Jose. Yet neither suburb awarded any CDBG funds to an immigrant organization in 2004-07, as shown in Table 2. As smaller cities, Fremont and Mountain View had less money to allocate, making it harder to give many grants. Nevertheless, *none* of the CDBG monies available to community organizations went to immigrant organizations. The lack of funding is even more surprising when we consider that the CDBG program targets community development activities and service provision to low- and moderate-income persons. While the two suburban cities have, on average, a lower percentage of poor people than the two central cities, the foreign-born make up a *larger* proportion of the poor population in these smaller municipalities than in San Francisco and San Jose.

[Table 2 about here]

In contrast, over the same three years, San Francisco gave grants to 38, 40, and 41 immigrant organizations, respectively, out of a total of 130, 151, and 124 organizations funded. Immigrant organizations thus accounted for between 26.5 and 33.1 percent of CDBG grant recipients and they tended to receive slightly more funding, on average, than non-immigrant organizations. Over \$4 million went to immigrant organizations in each of the years studied, which equaled 34.2 and 33.7 percent of all grants allocated to community organizations in 2004-05 and 2005-06, respectively, and 40.4 percent of allocations to community organizations in 2006-07. The funding proportions are in line with the proportion of immigrants living in San Francisco and the proportion of foreign born among the city's poor population.

The situation in San Jose stands between that of the suburbs and San Francisco. San Jose received a smaller overall entitlement grant than San Francisco and allocated less CDBG monies to community organizations, funding 39 groups in 2004-05, 38 in 2005-06, and 37 in 2006-07. Of these grant recipients, seven were immigrant organizations in each funding cycle, representing 17.9 to 18.9 percent of all organizations funded. As in San Francisco, immigrant organizations received, on average, a larger grant than non-immigrant organizations, and the average monetary value of grants to immigrant organizations rose over time. In 2004-05, immigrant nonprofits received 18.4 percent of all funding available to community organizations; this increased in each subsequent year, to 23.5 percent and 27.5 percent, respectively. These percentages are quite a bit lower than the proportion of immigrants in the general population, 39 percent, or the percentage of foreign born among all those categorized as poor, 42 percent, but we see evidence that immigrant needs are somewhat visible to city officials who allocate and administer CDBG funds.¹⁹

One possible explanation for the variation in funding could be the absence of immigrant organizations in suburban cities. However, our analysis of officially registered 501(c)(3) organizations indicates that, if anything, immigrant organizations make up a smaller part of the total nonprofit universe in San Francisco, at 14.1 percent, than in the other three cities. San Francisco—whose organizational landscape has been described as hyperpluralistic (e.g., DeLeon 1992)—stands out for the sheer number of officially registered nonprofits, at 4,203, of which 591 are predominantly immigrant-oriented. But when we consider the relative number of immigrant nonprofits per 1,000 foreign-born residents, San Francisco (and San Jose) offer a less dense civic infrastructure than Fremont or Mountain View. In the suburbs, immigrant organizations account for 24.5 percent and 20.7 percent, respectively, of all officially registered nonprofits, for approximately 4.6 and 7.8 immigrant organizations per 1,000 foreign-born residents. Lack of funding in suburban cities cannot be explained by an absence of immigrant organizing; indeed, immigrant organizations face greater competition in San Francisco.²⁰

Alternatively, some might wonder whether a few mainstream umbrella organizations are offering immigrant-targeted services in the suburbs, given that only a dozen or fewer organizations are funded. Appendix A provides a list of all nonprofits that received any CDBG grant in each city during the 3-year period of our study. We investigated the grant recipients in Fremont and Mountain View and a sample of non-immigrant grant recipients in San Jose and San Francisco to see whether the suburban non-immigrant grantees were qualitatively different than those in the big cities.

They were not. In both central cities and suburbs, some non-immigrant organizations also serve sub-groups of immigrants. This is hardly surprising, given the region's demographics and nonprofits' public service orientation. Kidango, a nonprofit child development agency, is

dedicated to a multicultural curriculum, integration of an economically diverse set of families, and inclusion of special needs children. One branch of the organization received funding from the city of Fremont and another received support from San Jose. In Mountain View, a staff member of the Community Services Agency, a CDBG recipient that provides emergency assistance and social services, explained that “a community needs to be welcoming of its immigrant population.” People of various ethnic backgrounds receive assistance and the same staff member noted that Russian immigrants often worked as volunteers in the food pantry. Likewise, the Ingleside Community Center in San Francisco, an organization that has long served African Americans, more recently began outreach to the growing Chinese immigrant population in the neighborhood. Some suburban nonprofits that receive CDBG funds provide services to immigrant residents, but the same is true in San Francisco and San Jose, cities that also fund immigrant-specific organizations. As we discuss further below, it is not the case that suburbs have awarded grants to umbrella organizations with concerted immigrant outreach as part of a distinct strategy of inclusive funding.

Furthermore, even with outreach efforts by some mainstream organizations, services for immigrants are often inadequate. An assessment of immigrant service needs conducted in 2000 in Santa Clara County (which includes the cities of San Jose and Mountain View) found that immigrants receive only half the services that native-born residents do while they have two to four times greater need than native-born residents (Immigrant Relations and Integration Services 2004). A member of Mountain View’s Human Relations Commission, charged with overseeing the CDBG allocation process, noted that among “the usual suspects that come to our meetings,” the mainstream community activists and leaders who are “for the most part, very intelligent, very well spoken” appear to have limited awareness of the city’s diverse population. We now turn to investigating this dynamic more closely.

Understanding Variation: Suburban Free-riding

Lack of CDBG funding in our suburbs cannot be explained by anti-immigrant ideologies. Anti-immigrant attitudes characterize other suburban destinations (Brettell and Nibbs 2011; Chavez 2008; Perea 1996), but officials in the Bay Area usually appreciate immigrants’ economic contributions and cultural diversity.²¹ During Fremont’s 50th anniversary celebration, programming included cricket matches and Bollywood dancing (Staff 2006). One appointed official underscored that a melting pot paradigm is “unrealistic, outdated, and to some people, offensive,” and proudly explained that Fremont “is in fact more diverse than many larger cities. We have people here who speak 137 different languages.” These suburbs are eager to reap the symbolic, cultural, and economic benefits of their immigrant populations.

Yet many suburban officials do not view immigrant organizations as partners in public-private initiatives for ameliorating the situation of poor or modest-income residents. This occurs because many do not see immigrants as part of their municipality’s civic infrastructure. In some cases, immigrants and their organizations have no civic visibility at all; in other cases, suburban officials acknowledge immigrants’ presence, but have little understanding of their specific needs. In doing so, they often contend that immigrants’ needs are already served by other cities. Historically, suburban residents “free-rided” on the jobs and culture of central cities, while failing to contribute property taxes or municipal levies to deal with urban poverty. Today, suburban cities like Mountain View and Fremont free-ride—intentionally or not—on the immigrant services offered in larger central cities nearby. Unlike before, where suburban and

urban residents were pitted against each other, the new free-riding produces civic and social inequalities between residents in the same political jurisdiction.

Some officials simply know little about the city's demographics. Such invisibility was epitomized in an interview with the executive director of a Fremont city agency that oversees nonprofits offering social services. Despite her many years of experience, she recounted, "We're applying for a mental health grant to work with welfare recipients, and to our surprise one of the language requirements for our area was Vietnamese. So, we must have some folks who are out there who speak Vietnamese." This official does not have negative feelings toward immigrants, but she simply does not view immigrant-origin residents as a distinct part of the city's disadvantaged population.²² Similarly, a Human Relations Commission representative in Mountain View referred to the South Asian community as a "small, but growing group," despite the fact that there are six organized Indian organizations in the city and Asian Indians make up about six percent of the city's population.

In other cases, officials know that immigrants live in the city but have not identified or reached out to immigrant organizations. The suburban official who criticized a melting pot model headed Fremont's Human Relations Commission, the government body that receives CDBG grant requests and makes funding recommendations to city council. While the Commission's evaluations are advisory, the official noted, "I don't know if the Council's ever not taken the Commission's [recommendations]." In this context, it was striking how few immigrant organizations the official could name in the city's civic infrastructure. Asked about groups active in Fremont across a long list of topical areas, the official only mentioned one Afghan organization, a Sikh Gudwara, and a local resident active in the Muslim community.²³ Similarly, in discussing the 50th anniversary event, she recounted, "We reached out to...business associations, to the Chamber of Commerce, to all sorts of people. We reached out to the school communities, the school districts, all the private schools, to the arts community, to all the artists, and the symphony and to the sports teams and...to all the bunch of neighborhood groups and PTAs and crime watch." Immigrant organizations were notably absent from her list, despite the 102 officially registered immigrant nonprofits identified in the NCCS database. In a similar manner, an official on Mountain View's Human Relations Commission, which has a similar mandate regarding CDBG allocations, could not name a local group that worked with immigrants or refugees other than the Mountain View Day Worker Center; NCCS data indicate that the city is home to 46 registered immigrant nonprofits.²⁴

It is not the case that suburban immigrant groups shun partnerships with government as a matter of ideology or prefer only private donations. Our interviews, media stories, and the financial reports of a few prominent suburban organizations indicate that immigrant leaders welcome funding from county, state, and federal governments when they are able to secure grants (e.g., Benson 2007). NCCS data show that two registered immigrant organizations in Fremont—the Afghan Coalition and India Community Center (ICC)—had revenues from government sources (NCCS 2005). The executive director of the ICC explained that government grants support senior programming, while other activities are funded through individual and corporate donations as well as membership dues.

Despite their presence in suburban communities, immigrant organizations such as ICC nevertheless repeatedly fail to appear on the rolls of CDBG recipients. This reflects the often contradictory perspective officials have towards these organizations. One discourse suggests that well-organized immigrant groups do not need public monies. A non-elected Fremont city official explained, expressing admiration for ICC's activities, "most organizations would [use a]

paid position, [but] they find highly-skilled volunteers to donate their time to them. I'm very impressed with that." Organizational prowess—usually something city officials appreciate in allocating grants—becomes a reason not to fund groups perceived to have the wherewithal to organizing themselves. Conversely, a lack of organization also serves as a rationale for limited public-private partnerships. In considering the city's Latino population, many of whom live in low- or modest-income households, the same city official said, "We have, I'm sure, a whole labor force of undocumented workers from Mexico and Guatemala and other places, but for various reasons they don't get to organize. The places where they probably are most organized are around certain...Catholic churches." Seen to have limited civic infrastructure, residents' needs are left to religious institutions. And even when a highly disadvantaged group organizes, there is no guarantee of CDBG funding. The Mountain View Day Worker Center, which serves an overwhelmingly Latino immigrant clientele and is one of the few formal day labor centers in Silicon Valley, received no CDBG support from the city of Mountain View from 2004 to 2007.

We suggest that this dynamic arises because the social construction of target populations places immigrants outside the circle of legitimate recipients of public grants. This is done in a variety of ways. A few suburban officials and civic leaders hinted that immigrants might not be fully local residents since they retain ties to their countries of origin. As one civic leader put it, reflecting on the suburb's immigrant population, "a lot of the sort of people who [have] come to this country recently—probably because of the internet and business and world economy—they're here, but one foot here and one foot still in the country that they came from."

Another narrative suggests that immigrant suburbanites are uniformly wealthy. One Fremont city councilor explained, "We're not dealing with the same kind of immigrant issues that most communities deal with in terms of the low-skilled workers and all of the debate that you hear now about the immigrant community. We've got one of the wealthiest immigrant populations." Silicon Valley is certainly home to high-skilled, well-off immigrants, but the parallel low-wage immigrant population often goes unnoticed. Asked specifically about the Latino population, a group with significant pockets of poverty, the same official said there was no organized presence in his city, but there seemed to be some activities in other cities that Fremont's Latinos could access.

A third discourse views immigrant concerns as particularly insular. An elected official in Fremont, predicating his remarks with, "I don't mean it [as] derogatory," then went on to explain that various organizations in the low-income Afghan community were centered on "self-help issues" and "improving their own lot...mostly it's for the welfare of their people. Help get them educated; help, you know, [with] citizenship." The label "their people" and the claim of insularity stood in contrast to the official's inclusive language around another group of residents: "We have a large number of active seniors," he commented, especially underscoring those associated with the city-funded Senior Center. Particular social constructions of immigrant communities—as excessively transnational, rich, small, or insular—help drive suburban free-riding, even in immigrant destinations such as Fremont, which is home to one of the largest Afghan communities in the United States.

Importantly, such arguments are articulated in a regional context that allows suburban officials to place immigrant residents' needs outside the suburb's jurisdiction. An elected official in Mountain View acknowledged, "it's certainly very visible, that you have ethnic segments of the community." However, the official also explained that given limited resources and a small staff, the city calls on volunteers to deal with the needs of ethnic communities. According to a number of suburban officials, it is impractical for small cities to pay for

immigrant services given the availability of such services and immigrant organizations in neighboring jurisdictions. A Fremont city councilor explained, discussing what he viewed as the small number of Vietnamese in his city, “Obviously, there are Vietnamese people [here], but my guess is that they probably go to San Jose for their, you know, ethnic involvements.” Such arguments carry some face validity. The Vietnamese-origin population in Fremont is 5,600, compared to almost 90,000 Vietnamese-origin residents in San Jose, and Fremont’s operating budget is a fraction of its big city neighbor. Yet a non-trivial segment of the city’s most disadvantaged residents speak Vietnamese. They are expected to rely on San Jose’s nonprofit infrastructure, a 30-minute drive away or an hour on public transportation.²⁵

Strikingly, appeals to economies of scale and references to the availability of services in other jurisdictions are not used when it comes to senior services or programs for handicapped residents, two populations that received a substantial proportion of Fremont’s CDBG monies in the period studied. We do not want to imply that seniors and the handicapped are not deserving of public grants, but rather that public officials do not reflect on why Fremont’s Senior Center, serving 21,000 residents over 65, received four grants totaling almost \$270,000, but no Latino organization received CDBG support, despite a population of over 32,000. Asked explicitly about the city’s Latino community, an elected Fremont official constructed a narrative to minimize the group’s size by making explicit reference to other cities: “the percentage of Latinos in Fremont are small compared to other communities.” Yet Fremont’s Latino population represents 15 percent of all city residents—a proportion on par with San Francisco. Such appeals to economies of scale—there are bigger immigrant populations in other cities with larger budgets, as well as a longer history of immigrant support services—are used by suburban officials to rationalize the absence of funding in their own municipality. Immigrant services become the purview of the suburbs’ larger and presumably richer municipal siblings.

We label this phenomenon *suburban free-riding*. It results from suburban decision-makers’ taken-for-granted ideas about suburban life—often rooted in iconic images more appropriate to the 1950s and 1960s—and from assumptions about the needs of immigrants arrived at without dialogue with immigrant organizations.²⁶ A Fremont city councilor of immigrant origins, for example, described a small group of residents very active in city affairs who have “lived here forever, who [see] Fremont as a rural community and not even as a suburban community.” These individuals still imagine a place with fields and a time when the city “was fairly uniform and unified.” In this context, immigration and minority issues are big city problems, not those of a bedroom community. We speculate that especially in regions with longstanding immigrant gateways such as San Francisco, and even 21st century gateways like San Jose, the presence of central cities reinforces the notion that immigrant services are a big city jurisdiction.²⁷

The phenomenon of suburban free-riding is apparent to the staff of immigrant organizations in San Jose and San Francisco. A staff member of a prominent Vietnamese organization in San Jose, which receives CDBG money, explained that many clients and volunteers come from outside San Jose, including Fremont. Similarly, a staff member with La Raza Centro Legal, a CDBG grantee organization founded to serve Hispanic immigrants in San Francisco’s Mission district, commented, “We’ve been in the community since 1973 and we’ve built a reputation with the high quality legal services we provide...I’d say that just under 50 percent of our clientele comes from San Francisco, but a majority of our clientele comes from San Mateo County...and as far as San Jose in the south.” A staff member with the Vietnamese Community Center of San Francisco, also a recipient of CDBG funds, told us that her

organization traditionally served residents in the low-income Tenderloin district, but now also helps Vietnamese-speaking clients from south of San Francisco and the East Bay. The widespread demand for services highlights the success and regional reputation of these organizations, but it also reflects the absence of comparable services in the suburbs.

Suburban governments' lack of partnership with immigrant organizations flies in the face of suburban officials' recognition of the value of working with nonprofits. A Mountain View elected official praised the partnership that the city had formed with a former CDBG-funded nonprofit dedicated to music and arts: "They have a significant impact on the community because they also have programs within the schools that would not be available because of the budget constraints on the schools. They actually create programs...And the city of course gets a benefit out of that." Immigrant concerns, in comparison, were often relegated to special municipal commissions set up to promote tolerance in Fremont and Mountain View. Officials also expected that a few prominent minority leaders, such as a city council's one or two immigrant-origin members, would serve as liaisons to the city's immigrant communities.

The situation is different in the region's big cities. San Francisco and San Jose also face enormous budget challenges, but local officials view partnerships with immigrant organizations as a productive and efficient way to address the needs of city residents. As a high-level administrator in San Francisco commented:

In a place as diverse as San Francisco...where there is a significant immigrant and refugee population, we can't just idly stand by and ignore these people...Our efforts at reaching out to immigrants and refugees in this city, I think, would be a lot less effective without the various immigrant groups that we fund. We simply wouldn't be able to reach into some pockets of the immigrant community. These organizations—and they'll also tell you that—they have a better ability to connect and deliver the kinds of services that immigrants need.

Officials in both central cities, but especially in San Francisco, consistently talked about the advantages of partnerships with immigrant organizations, even though the foreign born make up a smaller percentage of their overall city and poor populations than in the suburbs. San Jose and San Francisco cannot free-ride on the resources of others and invest in local immigrant organizations, though they vary in the extent to which they do so.

Understanding Variation: A Continuous and 21st Century Immigrant Gateway

San Jose and San Francisco differ from the suburbs and each other in the proportion of CDBG funding they allocate to immigrant organizations. Many more immigrant organizations in San Francisco enjoyed, collectively, a larger share of CDBG funding. These public-private partnerships occur even though immigrant organizations face resource competition from a much denser civil society: San Francisco counts over five 501(c)(3) organizations per 1,000 residents, almost double the concentration of nonprofits in Mountain View, and more than two times the concentration in San Jose and Fremont. A key explanation, we argue, lies in San Francisco's history of immigration. Historical legacies have produced a broad and sophisticated immigrant civic infrastructure and created a normative orientation among elected and non-elected city officials that immigrants can and should make claims on city resources.

San Francisco's history as a continuous immigrant gateway has produced a diverse set of immigrant organizations with expertise, networks, and a strong sense that they are legitimate stakeholders in the city. Considering all formally registered nonprofit organizations in the four cities, roughly 40-45 percent acquired 501(c)(3) status before 1990, as shown in Table 2.²⁸

Focusing only on immigrant organizations in San Francisco, 50 percent are longstanding nonprofits. Roughly a dozen date back to the late 19th century, when the city experienced significant migration from China, Italy, Ireland, the Philippines, and Russia. Immigrant nonprofits in the other three cities are, on average, more recently registered. Even in San Jose, home to over 350,000 immigrants, only 30 percent of immigrant organizations were formal 501(c)(3) organizations before 1990, a much “younger” organizational profile.

An older stock of immigrant organizations in San Francisco also helps to incubate a new generation of immigrant organizations as the immigrant population changes. A staff member with the International Institute of San Francisco (IISF) explained:

We were founded in 1918 to help early immigrants to this country, many of them from Europe. And we still do that type of service work today, but our work also lives on through a number of other organizations...We founded the Chinese Newcomers Service Center in 1969. And what is now the Southeast Asian Community Center, we started that in 1976, and then we also had a hand in getting seed funding to start the Filipino Newcomer Service Center, this was also in the 1970s...We created these spin offs because there was a demand for services for specific groups of immigrants and refugees, and these services at the time IISF couldn't provide or simply couldn't provide fast enough.

New organizations then can build on the know-how and reputation of established groups.

Would-be leaders of new immigrant organizations, who are sometimes staff or volunteers from existing groups, can also access an array of resources for leadership development and grant writing in San Francisco. A staff member with the Zellerbach Family Foundation, a grant-making institution in San Francisco noted:

An organization called CompassPoint provides workshops to teach nonprofit staff leadership and management skills and also strategies to increase the impact of their advocacy...Then there's Partnership for Immigrant Leadership and Action, which is...a nonprofit that specifically provides technical assistance to other nonprofits in low-income immigrant communities.

Thus, successive generations of immigrant organizations and an identifiable infrastructure of support groups generate knowledge, expertise, and confidence to engage local government.

Civic infrastructure is not enough, however. A continuous history of immigration also creates a normative and cognitive environment where the provision of immigrant services is an accepted city practice and where immigrant organizations are visible, legitimate partners. Many of the CDBG-funded immigrant organizations that we visited in San Francisco prominently displayed awards of appreciation from the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor's Office, which shows on a more symbolic level that immigrant organizations are incorporated into the city's sociopolitical fabric. The city also recognizes that disadvantaged populations can evolve as migration flows change. San Francisco's 2005-10 Consolidated Plan, which structures CDBG priorities, explicitly states that community development must address “the unanticipated needs of existing and emerging populations.”²⁹ In contrast, suburban officials often appear reluctant to challenge longstanding grant-making patterns. As one suburban official who participated in awarding grants put it, “You see [immigrants] in the grant process. We had the Afghan women come to us and request money...[But] we only get a certain amount [of money]...you're going to take money from somewhere else to give it to them.” In San Francisco, city officials acknowledge such trade-offs, but view immigrant organizations as legitimate grantees.

From the viewpoint of city officials, public-private partnerships leverage the linguistic skills and service work of immigrant organizations. One high-level San Francisco administrator said, “I think literally 50 percent of our city’s delivery of services is accomplished through nonprofits, particularly in the health field, social services, and services for the aging population. Additionally, nonprofits play a key role in identifying problems for us to solve...[Immigrant organizations] should be there, because essentially they represent people who have yet to gain access to government.”³⁰ City officials also partner with immigrant organizations because they offer channels of communication to city residents. As one city supervisor put it, speaking approvingly of the advocacy and service efforts of immigrant organizations:

Nonprofits briefed me and my staff...and we recognized some startling facts, that about a quarter of San Franciscans are less than proficient in English...The entire city is at potential risk if the government cannot communicate with the citizenry in times of emergency, certainly, but on an on-going basis, we have services. That is why government exists, to provide services, and if we can’t communicate with a quarter to a half of our citizenry, then what are we doing?

In San Francisco, both elected and non-elected city officials lauded the leveraging that Frasure and Jones-Correa (2010) also identified in the suburbs of Washington, D.C.

Leveraging is thus possible in large cities and smaller suburbs, but a focus on the social construction of target populations helps explain when the relevant city officials see such public-private partnerships as advisable. This also helps explain differences in funding between San Francisco and San Jose. Interviews with elected and appointed officials in San Jose hint at a wider gulf between the city and immigrant civil society. Some officials, like one Housing Commissioner, underscore the city’s diversity—“there is no real majority here anymore”—and its experience with immigration to claim that immigrants find a more welcoming environment in San Jose than in many other American cities. But this sentiment was less widespread than in San Francisco. As a San Jose city councilor explained in discussing how city government manages immigrants’ issues, “We work with a representative from the consulates.” Similar to some suburban officials, this councilor viewed relations with immigrant communities as working through liaisons rather than direct engagement in public-private partnerships involving CDBG or other government grants. The emphasis on consulates also underscored the foreign background—and perhaps less legitimate claims—of these residents.

In San Jose, a few city councilors had a hard time naming a single immigrant or ethnic organization in the city, similar to some of the suburban officials. One San Jose councilor acknowledged that “there are [immigrant] groups who interface with the City Council to try to settle issues,” but then explained, “I don’t know all the names of these organizations. But there are organizations in the city that help people.” In fact, we identify 412 immigrant organizations among the officially registered nonprofits in San Jose. The councilor’s lack of knowledge probably helps explain why, of about 38 organizations funded annually through CDBG monies from 2004 to 2007, only 7 were immigrant organizations. This included only one Latino organization, in a city where 31 percent of the population is Latino. San Francisco, where Latinos make up 14 percent of the population, funded more Latino organizations, groups that city officials readily identified by name.

As a 21st century gateway city, immigrant organizations in San Jose have not yet achieved the experience, legitimacy, and authoritative voice to challenge such exclusions. They have, on average, shorter institutional histories since immigrants formed a much smaller proportion of the population from the 1950s to the 1980s. The leader of a pan-Asian

organization in San Jose contrasted his group's growing pains with allied, and more established, organizations in San Francisco, "It was great that we have operated for three years, but we did run across some issues within the organization that would have helped tremendously if we would have had some sort of document to go back to." Shorter institutional histories affect leaders' confidence in pressuring city officials and hinder their ability to advocate for funding.

It is also harder for immigrant leaders to find adequate resources to set up and run new organizations. For example, when San Jose's Parks and Recreation Department mandated 501(c)(3) status for all groups receiving city support, including renting city properties, a young second-generation Latina who heads an Aztec dance troupe had difficulties buying insurance and learning how to file the paperwork needed to register as a nonprofit. San Jose is home to leadership development organizations, such as the San Jose Leadership Council, which provides technical assistance and training for individuals willing to pay its \$2,195 tuition bill. Given, however, its substantial fee, its business orientation, and limited outreach to immigrants, the Leadership Council does not play a role analogous to CompassPoint and Partnership for Immigrant Leadership and Action in San Francisco.

Sheer city size—including a larger budget and more developed bureaucracy—does, however, generate some openings for immigrant populations, openings that are more limited in the suburbs. In San Jose, the Strong Neighborhood Initiative directed redevelopment funding and staff outreach to "blighted" areas. Some of these areas were immigrant neighborhoods with an under-developed civic infrastructure. As a city employee explained, "[The] intent [was] to reach out to everybody within the area to try to bring them to these meetings, to begin a conversation... We would actually do grassroots organizing to get people to come out... going door-to-door, talking to people, asking them what their issues were and then try to get them to come out to these community-wide meetings." A number of staff members were multi-lingual, and in some cases they helped neighborhoods with CDBG grant applications. According to one staff person, these efforts increased civic engagement by bringing more people into municipal discussions and fostering networks between participants. It also increased residents' sense of legitimacy, "They feel far more entitled, far more inclined to say, 'Hey, this is an issue our [City] Council should have had.'" In line with the arguments of Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005), San Jose's larger bureaucratic structure provides more information and practical help for interacting with the city than in the suburbs, which is especially important in cultivating new groups. This facilitates public-private partnerships with immigrant communities and generates a greater sense of civic inclusion on both sides.

Concluding Thoughts and Future Extensions

Whether targeting native-born residents or immigrants, the work done by community organizations is frequently conceived of as taking place in the urban core of large cities. Yet immigration, gentrification, and new patterns of job growth have rendered suburban communities much more diverse—in socioeconomic, linguistic, racial, and cultural terms—than ever before, and these dynamics have also contributed to the rapid growth of 21st century gateway cities and suburban immigrant destinations. Are governments in these new destinations building partnerships with immigrant residents and their organizations, especially with those of low or modest income?

Based on our comparison of CDBG allocations in four Bay Area cities, we conclude that immigrant organizations are incorporated in the traditional immigrant gateway of San Francisco, they are partially seen, but inadequately served in San Jose, a 21st century gateway city, and they

are invisible or ignored in the new suburban destinations of Fremont and Mountain View. In San Francisco, immigrant organizations receive a share of public resources on par with their proportion in the city population and among poor residents; in San Jose, officials allocate some resources to immigrant organizations, but much less than immigrants' prevalence in the poor population. Most striking, in the large and smaller suburban cities of Fremont and Mountain View, no immigrant organization garnered a single dollar in CDBG funding over the 3-year period we studied, even though these suburbs are home to a higher proportion of immigrant residents than the big cities and immigrants facing linguistic, economic, and legal hardships form a larger proportion of their poor population—the very group CDBG funds target. For welfare state researchers, these findings parallel those of Allard, when he concluded, “the amount of assistance received in a social service-based system is determined by the neighborhood in which one lives, not one’s level of need” (2009: 36). For scholars of immigration, funding disparities support the contention that researchers must distinguish between different types of immigrant-receiving jurisdictions when studying the “new geography” of immigrant settlement (Frey 2006; Jones-Correa 2006; Singer 2004; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008).

Beyond documenting inter-city variation, we develop an argument for what accounts for these differences. We contend that San Francisco’s continuous exposure to migration over the 20th century, as compared to San Jose’s more recent experiences, has produced a vibrant civic infrastructure of immigrant organizations that have the experience, networks, and expectation that they should be partners with city officials. Their expectations are, for the most part, shared by government officials, who draw on a narrative of the city as an immigrant destination and a history of public-private partnerships to justify including immigrants in social policy.

Our research also shows that city officials in the immigrant suburbs free-ride on the funding that neighboring central cities disperse to immigrant organizations and the services those groups deliver, even though CDBG monies are supposed to be dedicated to the residents of a specific city, not the region. Suburban officials in a politically progressive region such as the San Francisco Bay Area celebrate diversity among their residents. But when it comes to public-private partnerships, they employ a variety of narrative strategies and rationales to place immigrants outside their socially constructed notions of target populations. In some cases, immigrants appear completely invisible, while in many others they are too transnational, too rich, or too organized for public support or, conversely, they are too insular, too small, or too unorganized. Suburban officials also explain the lack of outreach and support as stemming from capacity constraints—suburbs have less money, less staff, and less experience dealing with these issues—but we suggest that suburban officials also use the established services offered by central city immigrant organizations to perpetuate the lack of investment in their own jurisdictions. Although geographers, sociologists, and students of urban politics increasingly highlight the rise of “ethnoburbs” and “edge gateways” as a critical frontier for immigrant integration (Li 1998; Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002; Price and Singer 2008; Zhou 2008), our research shows that elected and non-elected government officials in immigrant suburbs have not yet come to terms with their cities’ changing demography, even if their political ideology welcomes diversity.

Some might wonder whether our results merely reflect the dynamics of political exchange discussed by Marwell (2004, 2007). After all, 62 percent of San Francisco’s foreign-born residents are U.S. citizens, while the proportion is only 35 percent in Mountain View; San Jose and Fremont fall in-between. We cannot rule out a role for electoral politics, especially when a lack of voting rights could make it harder for immigrants to challenge inertia in municipal services and grants-making. But the evidence suggests any such link is far from

direct. San Francisco's legislative body, the Board of Supervisors, was dominated by white, native-born officials in 2006. So it is not the case that city government reached out to immigrant organizations thanks to a diverse local legislature or patronage-style ethnic politics. Furthermore, the proportion of naturalized immigrants who were living in poverty in San Francisco in 2006, nine percent, was lower than the proportion of poor native-born residents (11 percent) and far below the poverty rate among non-citizen migrants (18 percent). Those most in need of human and social services are the ones shut out of electoral politics.

Instead, our field research suggests that a key obstacle outside San Francisco lies in immigrants not being seen as legitimate interlocutors and civic partners. The social construction of immigrant residents and of the municipality—for example, as a bedroom community without needy immigrants—rationalizes the lack of public-private partnerships. The growing research on new immigrant destinations must therefore move beyond simple juxtapositions between progressive and anti-immigrant localities. Instead, scholars need to consider how characteristics such as size, immigrant history, and location in a metropolitan region affect responses to immigration, paying attention to civic presence, the social construction of legitimacy—of people and organizations—and civic infrastructures. Adopting a regional approach, as we do here, illuminates how suburbs free-ride on central cities' resources. The fact that such free-riding occurs in the Bay Area—an unusually progressive region with relatively generous public spending on services, an active civil society, and an extremely high proportion of immigrant residents—raises the possibility that free-riding might be widespread. Most regions would have conditions much less conducive for public-private partnerships around immigrant services.

Future studies need to assess how broadly our findings hold in areas with different immigration histories and regional dynamics. Scholarship in this area is just beginning, but there is evidence that the empirical story we tell holds elsewhere, although research has focused more on establishing spatial mismatch than explaining it. In a study of community organizations serving immigrant women, Truelove (2000: 141) found that while only 24 percent of recent immigrants and 26 percent of established immigrants in metropolitan Toronto lived in the central city, fully 53 percent of all immigrant social service providers were located in the city of Toronto, a traditional gateway in Canada. In metropolitan Chicago, CDBG beneficiary populations varied widely between the central city and outlying suburbs. The Chicago suburbs, like Fremont and Mountain View, tended to allocate grants to organized groups of the elderly, disabled, and mentally handicapped rather than to a broad pool of low- to moderate-income residents (Rich 1993: 320-321). In another study, over half of municipal leaders surveyed across Chicago's suburbs felt that their municipality did not need assistance in developing strategies to serve immigrant residents and indicated no awareness of immigrant populations living in their municipality, even though the foreign-born population averages 19 percent across the region's suburbs (Metropolitan Mayors Caucus 2012). Suburban free-riding around traditional gateway cities is likely a widespread phenomenon, as also hinted at by research conducted in New York (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Marwell 2004, 2007) and Los Angeles (Valenzuela 2006).

Dynamics might vary in regions where the dominant central city is not a traditional immigrant gateway, such as Washington, D.C. or Atlanta.³¹ In such places, suburban elected and non-elected officials might take greater leadership in exchanging public funding or technical support for privately organized service provision by immigrant organizations, as in the case of day labor centers (Fine 2006; Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010). Without the narrative and established immigrant civic infrastructure of a traditional immigrant gateway, immigrant residents might face lower hurdles to being seen as legitimate targets of social policy. One study

of nonprofits in the D.C. area provides mixed evidence for this proposition. It found that over time, more immigrant organizations were locating in the suburbs; by 2007, of 533 immigrant organizations in the region, 41 percent were located in Maryland, a proportion on par with the 43 percent of the Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, and African immigrant residents. Conversely, however, 24 percent of immigrant organizations—usually those with more financial resources—were located in Washington, D.C., but only 6 percent of the region’s immigrants lived within the city limits (de Leon et al. 2009: 5). Organizational leaders also recounted some stories similar to those we document, such as service providers parrying local officials’ belief that all Asian migrants are rich and without service needs.

The case of metropolitan D.C. also raises the issue of change over time. We were only able to collect three years of CDBG data given the substantial hurdles in securing and verifying grant information, and the desire to match the financial data to our field research. Since then, Fremont and Mountain View have taken small steps to fund immigrant organizations. Fremont finally awarded the Afghan Coalition, founded in 1996, a CDBG grant in 2010-11, but it was the only immigrant organization to receive monies. Similarly, the Mountain View Day Worker Center, also founded in 1996, received a \$10,000 CDBG grant in 2007-08 and 2008-09, the only immigrant organization awarded a grant (City of Mountain View 2009: 21). This bolsters the argument that one of the comparative advantages that immigrants in San Francisco have is the age and experience of the city’s immigrant organizations. Combined with a political climate that is not particularly hostile to immigrant newcomers, this suggests that with time, funding patterns and conceptions of immigrant organizations as deserving partners might change in Bay Area suburbs. Given, however, that demographic realities have been changing much more quickly, this leaves tens of thousands of contemporary migrants with limited organizational sources of assistance, a situation likely replicated across the United States due to new geographies of immigration and poverty.

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Endnotes

¹ Low-wage immigration is only one contributor to growing suburban poverty. Gentrification in city centers, which is pricing out poor residents, also plays a role, as does the movement of employment opportunities outside the traditional city core.

² The proportion refers to those below 100 percent of the federal poverty level. Calculations by the authors from the U.S. Census FactFinder tool.

³ Suburbs can be defined in various ways, including by a population threshold or based on residents' average commute time to work. Our conception rests on a political delineation of space which, as Massey and Denton (1988) note, divides metropolitan areas into mutually exclusive units of local government that affect things such as property taxes and education systems. As we elaborate below, our designation of suburbs also reflects local residents' distinctions between the Bay Area's big cities and what they see as qualitatively different bedroom communities, even if these communities are relatively large.

⁴ Schneider and colleagues are particularly interested in policy design and policy content. We are primarily interested in how policy is applied in a context of changing demographics, which they underscore is an important area for future research.

⁵ For example, community organizations serving Hispanic immigrants in San Francisco (Rodriguez 2011: 91) and Portuguese immigrants in the Boston area (Bloemraad 2006: 187) benefited from Model Cities funding in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

⁶ A city's history of refugee resettlement might also be important (Andersen 2010; Bloemraad 2006; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008), but this often overlaps with a history of migration.

⁷ Scholars of urban politics also often contrast the political systems of large cities to reform-style suburban governments, which frequently include a council-manager form of government, at-large representative districts, and nonpartisan elections. However, the cities of Fremont and Mountain View are not "pure" reform cities: Fremont has both an elected mayor and appointed city manager, while in Mountain View the mayor and city manager are appointed. The central cities of San Francisco and San Jose have independently elected mayors, but also reform-style elements: San Jose has an appointed city manager and San Francisco has an appointed city administrator. Local elections in San Francisco and San Jose are nonpartisan, like in the suburbs, as required by California electoral law. San Francisco has experimented with both at-large and district elections and re-instituted district elections in 2000. San Jose has had district elections since 1978. Mountain View and Fremont both have city councils elected at-large. There is no stark and simple difference in these cities' political systems.

⁸ Population statistics reported in Table 1 and attributed in the text to 2006 are from three-year averages (2005-07) of the Census Bureau's American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). We use these data to match the time period of our CDBG funding data and field research. The map in Figure 1 is based on 2005-09 ACS data since tract-level data are only available in five-year estimates.

⁹ Our study design does not permit further distinctions between suburbs, by overall poverty level or change in poverty (Allard 2009) or by the particular political, social, and institutional differences in suburban poverty (Panchok-Berry, Rivas, and Murphy 2011). Studying such inter-suburban variation is an important next step in this field.

¹⁰ In 1920, the foreign born made up a much smaller share, 13 percent, of the national population.

¹¹ The poverty statistics are for individuals living under 100 percent of the federal poverty threshold. This metric references a family's total income for the previous year to thresholds based on an adequate food plan for different sized families, without adjustment for local cost of living. The data on children in disadvantaged households are for those living under 200 percent of this threshold. Given the very high cost of living in the Bay Area, people in this situation are living in very disadvantaged conditions.

¹² A third local legislator was African American; non-Hispanic whites held almost three-quarters of legislative seats.

¹³ The CDBG allocations we study went to the cities of San Jose, Fremont, and Mountain View, and the City and County of San Francisco. CDBG grant allocations are comparable across the four cities despite San Francisco's consolidated city/county structure since rules from the Department of Housing and Urban Development require that county funds only go to community organizations that serve populations in unincorporated areas of the county. Because nonprofits serve a wide range of clients, recipients of county grants often also receive city grants. Our examination of the CDBG grantee lists over 2004-07 for Alameda and Santa Clara counties, where the other three cities are located, show that organizations receiving county funds often received city funds as well.

¹⁴ There is one CDBG funding cycle per year and the allocation process is similar across cities. HUD requires cities to develop five-year Consolidated Plans, which identify the community development goals against which CDBG applications are evaluated. HUD also requires cities to provide for public participation throughout the strategic planning and allocation processes. Cities typically issue Requests for Proposals in November, with applications due in January of the following year. City commissions review applications, formulate funding recommendations, and invite public feedback. For the cities we studied, these are the Citizen's Committee on Community Development in San Francisco, the Neighborhood Services and Education Committee in San Jose, the Senior Citizens and Human Relations Commissions in Fremont, and the Human Relations Commission in Mountain View. Administrative agency staff administer the CDBG funds. These are the Mayor's Office of Community Development (now the Community Development Division within the Mayor's Office of Housing) in San Francisco, the Department of Housing in San Jose, the Human Services Department in Fremont, and the Community Development Department in Mountain View. City legislators review the funding recommendations, convene more public hearings where applicants can testify, and vote to finalize allocations by April or May. CDBG funds are made available to grantee organizations for the next fiscal year starting July 1.

¹⁵ We excluded private foundations, as these groups are often private tax shelters treated as distinct financial entities in analyses by nonprofit scholars (e.g., Boris and Steuerle 2006).

¹⁶ Other studies of immigrant or minority nonprofits have used different identification criteria, including the origins of directors and board members (Hung 2007; De Vita, Roeger, and Niedzwiecki 2009) or data on clients' origins (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; de Graauw 2008, 2012; Martin 2012). To cast as broad a net as possible, we focus on overall mission and activities and

use a wide array of sources to allocate organizations. For further details on methodology, see Gleeson and Bloemraad (2012).

¹⁷ Due to their nonprofit status, immigrant organizations are banned from partisan electioneering, but they can advocate for members and clients and engage in a limited amount of lobbying (Berry with Arons 2005; de Graauw 2008).

¹⁸ We completed 46 interviews in San Francisco, 65 in San Jose, 16 in Fremont, and 15 in Mountain View.

¹⁹ CDBG data for San Jose suggest that the city's attention to human and social services for immigrants might be growing over time, if not in the number of organizations funded, then in the money allocated. The trend, however, is based on the city's decision to give a few immigrant organizations significant resources for infrastructure investments, including a building purchase to expand services to the Korean American community and more office space for a Japanese American group. A Portuguese American group received a sizeable grant to renovate a kitchen used in nutritional programs.

²⁰ Indeed, the city of San Francisco explicitly acknowledges this problem. The city's 2005-10 Consolidated Plan, which lays out priorities for CDBG grants, notes, "The large number of non-profit organizations serving low-income communities in San Francisco is both an asset and a limitation. With a long history of serving the community, the sheer number of non-profits leads to increased competition for limited resources. Conversely, the benefits of a rich variety of social service organizations often translates to more community-based and culturally competent services for low-income residents" (CCSF 2006: 111).

²¹ While city officials were largely multicultural in orientation, there are pockets of anti-immigrant sentiment among suburban residents, just like in big cities. For example, a Fremont official recounted that when a Chinese American city councilor, born in the United States, proposed celebrating the national origins of city employees during the Fourth of July parade, "he got nasty e-mails and letters, you know, telling him to go back to the country he came from." Similarly, though Mountain View compiles a "diversity calendar" and showed significant support for May 1 immigrant rights marches, a representative of the Human Relations Commission spoke about antagonism among residents towards new immigrant arrivals, including antagonism by some of the city's established Mexican American residents.

²² In fact, the 2005-07 ACS estimated 5,600 residents of Vietnamese origin living in the city.

²³ The interview schedule asked respondents to name organizations in the city involved in the following areas: arts and music, education, health, senior citizen issues, labor unions, advocacy groups, ethnic and cultural groups, naturalization, citizenship and voting, immigrant and refugee settlement, civic groups or clubs, neighborhood associations, housing affordability issues, domestic violence groups, public safety and emergency preparedness, veterans groups, and religious organizations.

²⁴ The reactions in Fremont and Mountain View are not unique to these suburban cities and can be found in other Bay Area suburbs. In interviews for a different study, an elected official in Sunnyvale—a suburban city situated between Mountain View and San Jose—said that in his city, since "everyone is treated equally," the suburb does not "have many organizations or problems" in regards to what he saw as special interest immigrant activism. Forty-three percent of Sunnyvale's population was foreign-born in 2006.

²⁵ A study of commuting in California found that a disproportionate share of immigrants rely on public transit and that almost half of all transit commuters in the state are foreign-born, a significant barrier to accessing services in other cities (Handy et al. 2009: 11).

²⁶ A Latina community leader active in an all-Latina mom’s group, as well as her child’s PTA, contended that few city officials or local civic leaders reached out to Fremont’s Spanish-speaking population. As she recounted, “Before I was PTA President, we had two or three Caucasian people that were involved in PTA, and letters went home, but they went home in English...So, by me being there, and writing...in English and on the other side in Spanish... even though there was a language barrier, the fact that I had sent the letter out in two languages...there was a big change in [PTA] attendance.”

²⁷ Free-riding is not always vis-à-vis big cities; a few respondents listed neighboring suburbs as taking care of a particular immigrant-origin group. During an interview with an official on the Fremont Senior Citizens Commission, when asked about Portuguese-origin seniors, the official said the community is “mainly in Newark;” asked about those of Indian origin, the official pointed to programming in Milpitas; and when asked about the city’s Vietnamese population, the commissioner reported not knowing any Vietnamese organizations, “I know there is a Vietnamese community, but it’s not as large as some other” communities.


²⁸ This is the date that the IRS ruled an organization a legal nonprofit organization, a designation necessary for CDBG funding. In many cases, organizations are founded before gaining formal status as a charitable organization.

²⁹ San Francisco’s 2005-10 Consolidated Plan states in its discussion of goals and definition of community development that, “In recognition of the rapidly changing demographics and character of San Francisco, [the Mayor’s Office of Community Development] will make funding available to address the unanticipated needs of existing and emerging populations/ communities that cannot be addressed through our already identified strategies. During the past 25 years, this strategy has enabled San Francisco’s community development program to be a national leader in using CDBG to respond quickly and effectively to the AIDS crisis, the plight of refugees and immigrants, and the challenges of creating economic access for traditionally marginalized sub-populations” (CCSF 2006: 63).

³⁰ This view echoed a statement in San Francisco’s official 2005-10 Consolidated Plan for CDBG funding, which underscored, “Non-profit organizations provide an invaluable source of information regarding the changing needs, gaps in services and successes in our community development activities. These organizations often provide stability in neighborhoods that have few other resources for accessible information, assistance and services” (CCSF 2006: 111).

³¹ Such dynamics might also be affected by the history of nonprofit service provision to poor, native-born minorities. The four cities in our study had relatively small African American populations. At most, only seven percent of San Francisco’s residents reported being black. It is possible that with a larger, longstanding African American population, immigrants might benefit from building off the black community’s civic infrastructure or face additional competition for resources and more difficult challenges in modifying established social constructions of disadvantaged populations.

Figure 1: Proportion of Foreign-born Residents, San Francisco Bay Area, ca. 2007



Source: 2005-09 American Community Survey (tract-level estimates), U.S. Census Bureau.

Table 1. Socio-demographic Profile of Selected Bay Area Cities, 2005-07

	San Francisco		San Jose		Fremont		Mountain View	
		%		%		%		%
Total population	757,604		898,901		208,455		71,153	
Non-Hispanic White (only)	338,466	45	285,249	32	65,566	32	33,973	48
Non-Hispanic Black (only)	50,750	7	27,761	3	6,012	3	1,052	2
Non-Hispanic Asian (only)	238,344	32	274,338	31	96,044	46	17,959	25
Hispanic or Latino (of any race)	105,790	14	281,651	31	32,108	15	15,136	21
Foreign born (of total population)	270,481	36%	350,809	39%	90,522	43%	28,431	40%
Naturalized U.S. citizen (of FB pop)	166,504	62	177,498	51	47,683	53	9,981	35
Recent migrant, entered US in 2000 or later (of FB pop)	50,074	19	74,054	21	18,360	20	8,610	30
Speak English less than “very well” (of FB pop ages 5+)	172,782	24	222,585	27	43,978	23	14,415	22
World region of birth (of foreign born)								
Asia	167,475	62	201,686	58	69,135	76	12,741	45
Latin America	56,319	21	117,879	34	13,374	15	9,381	33
Europe	36,804	14	21,223	6	4,080	5	4,959	17
City residents in poverty*	88,426		90,996		10,969		4,499	
Foreign-born residents in poverty (of all in poverty)	34,400	39%	38,376	42%	5,250	48%	2,383	53%
Children under 18 living in poverty**	30,628		63,312		8,094		3,528	
Children in poverty with one or more foreign-born parents	22,228	73%	45,020	71%	5,789	72%	2,865	81%
Median individual income in past 12 months								
All residents	\$33,984		\$32,277		\$40,541		\$45,038	
Foreign-born residents	\$22,721		\$29,948		\$43,573		\$37,228	

* Individuals living below 100% of the federal poverty level, past 12 months.

** Children under 18 living at 200% or less of federal poverty level, last 12 months.

Source: American Community Survey, 3-year Estimates, 2005-07 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).

Table 2. Allocation of CDBG Funding to Community-based Organizations, 2004-07

	San Francisco		San Jose		Fremont		Mountain View	
Registered nonprofit organizations (all)*	4,203		1,987		416		222	
Nonprofits registered before 1990**	1,882	45.1%	898	45.6%	170	40.9%	96	43.4%
Orgs per 1,000 city residents	5.5		2.2		2.0		3.1	
Immigrant CBOs (percentage of all orgs)	591	14.1%	412	20.7%	102	24.5%	46	20.7%
Immigrant nonprofits registered before 1990	293	49.7%	122	30.0%	18	17.6%	11	23.9%
Imm orgs per 1,000 foreign-born residents	2.2		1.2		4.6		7.8	
FY 2004-05, CDBG grants								
Total number of CBO grantees	130		39		12		9	
Total imm CBO grantees (percentage of all)	38	29.2%	7	17.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total CBO-targeted funds	\$12,508,764		\$4,178,118		\$1,548,409		\$425,500	
Total funds to imm CBOs (percentage of total)	\$4,277,258	34.2%	\$769,430	18.4%	\$-	0.0%	\$-	0.0%
FY 2005-06, CDBG grants								
Total number of CBO grantees	151		38		14		8	
Total imm CBO grantees (percentage of all)	40	26.5%	7	18.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total CBO-targeted funds	\$12,924,218		\$4,082,095		\$986,560		\$876,666	
Total funds to imm CBOs (percentage of total)	\$4,359,107	33.7%	\$957,307	23.5%	\$-	0.0%	\$-	0.0%
FY 2006-07, CDBG grants								
Total number of CBO grantees	124		37		10		8	
Total imm CBO grantees (percentage of all)	41	33.1%	7	18.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total CBO-targeted funds	\$10,170,098		\$3,853,451		\$1,088,242		\$187,321	
Total funds to imm CBOs (percentage of total)	\$4,107,111	40.4%	\$1,060,976	27.5%	\$-	0.0%	\$-	0.0%

* Officially IRS registered 501(c)(3) organizations, excluding private foundations.

** Percentage calculation excludes 44 organizations with missing information.

Sources: Authors' calculations from database of 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations from National Center for Charitable Statistics and CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (annual CAPER reports) for City and County of San Francisco, City of San Jose, City of Fremont, and City of Mountain View.

Appendix A.1. Community-based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars – Mountain View, 2004-07

CBO Grantees	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07
Clara Mateo Alliance Shelter	7,000	5,590	4,429
Community Services Agency	87,407	90,903	65,048
Economic and Social Opportunities	30,000	30,000	13,656
Emergency Housing Consortium	16,027	18,786	89,885
Mayview Community Health Center	8,107	6,388	5,062
Mid Peninsula Housing Coalition	-	717,328	-
Project Sentinel	-	-	3,163
Second Harvest Food Bank	8,459	4,741	3,757
Senior Adults Legal Assistance	6,000	2,930	2,322
Sierra Vista I Rehabilitation	255,000	-	-
Social Advocates for Youth	7,500	-	-
Total Funding	425,500	876,666	187,321

Source: Authors' calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (annual CAPER reports) for City of Mountain View.

Appendix A.2. Community-based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars – Fremont, 2004-07

CBO Grantees	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07
4C's Child Care Development	-	-	19,989
Bay Area Community Services, Adult Day Center	36,701	36,701	36,701
Bridge Housing	800,000	50,000	-
California School for the Blind	-	27,561	-
Citizens Housing Corporation	-	50,000	-
Community Child Care Coordinating Council	19,989	19,989	-
Community Resources for Independent Living	10,100	-	-
Deaf Counseling and Referral Agency	7,000	7,000	-
ECHO	31,110	32,666	34,902
Kidango	200,064	142,443	87,736
LIFE Elder Care, Meal on Wheels	49,972	49,972	49,972
Project Sentinel	75,000	75,000	75,000
SAVE Shelter	74,042	40,228	56,228
Satellite/AEA (Satellite Housing Senior)	144,431	-	-
Tri City Homeless Coalition	-	155,000	200,000
Tri-City Health Center	100,000	250,000	250,000
Tri-City Volunteers Facility Renovation	-	-	277,714
Women on the Way to Recovery Center	-	50,000	-
Total Funding	1,548,409	986,560	1,088,242

Source: Authors' calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (annual CAPER reports) for City of Fremont.

Appendix A.3. Community-based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars – San Jose, 2004-07

Immigrant Organizations	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07
Ethiopian Community Services	36,103	34,297	30,290
Filipino-American Senior Opportunity Development	36,202	-	-
Korean-American Community Center	-	241,796	250,000
Mexican-American Community Services Agency	333,899	287,011	253,481
Portuguese Organization for Social Services	130,357	110,803	245,592
Santa Clara County Asian Law Alliance	55,855	50,269	44,395
Vietnamese Voluntary Foundation	84,043	76,738	70,211
Yu-Ai Kai/Japanese American Community Senior Service	92,971	156,393	167,007
Total Funding, Immigrant CBOs	36,103	34,297	30,290

Non-immigrant Organizations	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07
Alliance for Community Care	21,721	20,635	20,635
Bill Wilson Center	41,374	39,305	34,712
Catholic Charities of San Jose	180,534	226,582	203,295
Community Technology Alliance	21,793	20,703	20,703
Concern for the Poor	30,410	-	-
Deaf Community, Advocacy and Referral Agency	29,040	27,588	27,588
Economic and Social Opportunities	560,000	541,622	560,000
Emergency Housing Consortium	63,095	56,785	50,149
Family Supportive Housing	-	28,889	28,889
Franklin-McKinley Education Foundation	-	202,007	-
Fresh Lifelines for Youth	40,006	81,828	72,266
Friends Outside in Santa Clara County	31,030	-	-
InnVision	108,606	103,176	93,875
Kidango	193,287	-	-
Legal Aid Society of Santa Clara County	269,069	242,621	214,257
Live Oak Adult Day Services	30,496	28,971	28,971
Loaves and Fishes Family Kitchen	20,687	19,653	19,563
Mental Health Advocacy Project	24,824	23,583	23,583
Next Door Solutions to Domestic Violence	116,882	121,953	107,701

Outreach & Escort, Inc.	-	45,347	40,048
Project Sentinel	267,615	258,833	228,550
Rebuilding Together Silicon Valley	45,000	43,523	60,000
Respite and Research for Alzheimer's Disease	31,030	29,478	29,478
Sacred Heart Community Services	25,859	24,566	24,566
San Jose Conservation Corps	187,061	162,830	149,649
San Jose Smart Start Family Childcare	208,781	-	-
Santa Clara County Black Chamber of Commerce	93,920	90,838	93,920
Santa Clara University	54,927	26,531	26,531
Santa Clara Valley Blind Center	108,427	101,004	95,131
Second Harvest Food Bank	18,618	17,687	17,687
Senior Adult Legal Assistance	91,023	81,921	72,348
Services for Brain Impaired	20,687	19,653	19,653
Silicon Valley Economic Development Corp	287,481	278,047	287,481
Silicon Valley Independent Living Center	10,343	9,826	9,826
YWCA in Santa Clara Valley	175,062	148,803	131,420
Total Funding, Non-immigrant CBOs	3,408,688	3,124,788	2,792,475

Source: Authors' calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (annual CAPER reports) for City of San Jose.

Appendix A.4. Community-based Organizations Receiving CDBG Grants, Funding in Dollars – San Francisco, 2004-07

Immigrant CBOs	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07
African Immigrant and Refugee Resource Center	67,000	77,000	30,000
Arab Cultural and Community Center	60,000	40,000	38,000
Arriba Juntos	38,000	38,000	110,000
Asian & Pacific Islander Wellness Center	-	25,000	43,000
Asian, Inc.	211,180	210,889	175,000
Asian Law Caucus	55,500	55,500	53,500
Asian Neighborhood Design	391,000	269,000	292,860
Asian Pacific American Community Center	67,500	60,000	58,000
Asian Women's Shelter	39,500	31,500	35,500
Bindlestiff Studio	-	15,000	60,000
Brava! for the Women in the Arts	47,000	47,000	45,000
Career Resources Development Center	90,000	80,000	-
Central American Resource Center (CARECEN)	55,000	40,000	-
Centro del Pueblo	-	-	58,000
Centro Latino de San Francisco	-	-	50,000
Charity Cultural Services Center	125,000	100,000	80,000
Chinatown Community Development Center	431,761	420,535	435,000
Chinese for Affirmative Action	110,000	115,000	100,000
Chinese Newcomers Service Center	106,000	106,000	96,000
Chinese Progressive Association	-	-	40,000
Dolores Street Community Services	12,000	-	-
Donaldina Cameron House	45,000	115,000	35,000
Filipino-American Council of SF	50,000	-	-
Filipino-American Development Foundation	205,000	85,000	190,000
Gum Moon Residence Hall	-	15,000	15,000
Institute Familiar de la Raza	-	-	45,000
Instituto Laboral de la Raza	68,000	68,000	68,000
Japanese Community Youth Council	-	-	100,000
Jewish Family & Children's Services	-	67,744	-
Jewish Vocational and Career Counseling Service	81,317	90,300	60,000
La Casa de las Madres	52,000	-	77,000
La Raza Centro Legal	125,000	125,000	115,000

La Raza Community Resource Center	-	50,000	50,000
Manilatown Heritage Foundation	-	20,000	-
Mission Economic Development Association	417,000	460,000	383,000
Mission Hiring Hall, Inc.	131,000	119,000	162,250
Mission Language and Vocational School, Inc.	125,000	275,000	125,000
Mission Learning Center	106,500	75,000	75,000
Mission Neighborhood Centers	70,000	205,000	92,000
Mujeres Unidas y Activas	50,000	-	50,000
Nihonmachi Legal Outreach	93,000	57,639	93,001
Nihonmachi Little Friends	67,000	-	-
On Lok Day Services	114,000	100,000	-
San Francisco Conservation Corps - Wu Yee-Generations Child Development	-	60,000	-
Self-Help for the Elderly	80,500	80,500	207,000
Southeast Asian Community Center	226,500	226,500	200,000
Vietnamese Community Center of SF	50,000	50,000	35,000
Vietnamese Elderly Mutual Assistance Association	35,000	50,000	35,000
Vietnamese Youth Development Center	-	-	40,000
West Bay Pilipino Multi-Service Corp.	95,000	95,000	-
Wu Yee Children's Services	84,000	139,000	55,000
Total Funding, Immigrant CBOs	4,277,258	4,359,107	4,107,111

Non-immigrant CBOs	FY 04-05	FY 05-06	FY 06-07
Acorn Institute, Inc.	50,000	30,000	-
African American Art & Cultural Complex	245,000	55,000	-
A Home Away from Homelessness	-	-	35,000
AIDS Housing Alliance	-	25,000	35,000
AIDS Legal Referral Panel of the SF Bay Area	39,500	78,190	84,500
Arc Ecology	20,000	20,000	-
Ark of Refuge	439,364	12,000	-
Bar Association of SF Volunteer Legal Services	30,000	-	-
Bay Area Community Resources	-	40,000	-
Bay Area Legal Aid	42,000	42,000	40,000
Bay Area Video Coalition	100,000	60,000	-
Bayview Community Collaborative	-	23,000	-

Bayview Hunter's Point Center for Arts & Technology	-	40,000	103,000
Bayview Hunter's Point Multipurpose Center	-	60,000	-
Bayview Hunter's Point Multipurpose Senior Services	-	15,000	-
Bernal Heights Neighborhood Center	248,800	210,000	215,000
Board of Trustees of the Glide Foundation	186,000	30,000	48,000
Booker T. Washington Community Service Center	61,000	61,000	45,000
Boys & Girls Clubs of San Francisco	80,400	624,350	-
Brothers Against Guns	55,000	-	40,000
California Lawyers for the Arts	-	20,000	-
Catholic Charities CYO	61,500	76,500	45,000
Central City Hospitality House	92,150	51,650	31,650
Children's Council of SF	30,000	30,000	60,000
Clever Homes LLC	223,125	126,000	-
Community Alliance for Special Education (CASE)	25,000	25,000	25,000
Community Center Pjt of SF dba SF LGBT Community Center	-	100,000	100,000
Community Design Center	155,437	35,000	-
Community Housing Partnership	96,085	122,000	115,000
Community United Against Violence	27,000	27,000	27,000
Community Vocational Enterprises	41,500	51,875	50,000
Community Youth Center-San Francisco (CYC-SF)	73,000	73,000	71,000
Compass Community Services	37,000	37,000	37,000
CompassPoint Nonprofit Services	103,950	43,950	35,000
Conard House, Inc.	2,100	-	-
Earned Asset Resource Network (EARN)	25,000	50,000	50,000
Economic Opportunity Council of SF	25,000	15,000	38,000
Ella Hill Hutch Community Center	203,200	225,000	140,290
Episcopal Community Services of SF	30,000	100,000	100,000
Eviction Defense Collaborative, Inc.	-	25,000	30,000
Family School	-	50,000	-
Family Service Agency	226,000	-	-
Friends of the Urban Forest	-	60,000	40,000
Friendship House Association of American Indians	-	-	36,900
Girls After School Academy	-	40,000	40,000
Goodwill Industries of San Francisco, San Mateo & Marin Counties	-	-	75,000

GP/TODCO, Inc.	210,000	100,000	94,000
Growth and Learning Opportunities, Inc.	-	27,600	27,600
Haight Ashbury Food Program	65,000	45,000	25,000
Haight Ashbury Play Program for Youth (HAPPY)	35,000	-	-
Hearing and Speech Center of Northern California	45,000	55,000	45,000
Henry Ohlhoff House	120,000	-	-
Holy Family Day Home	-	33,500	-
Homeless Children's Network	-	40,000	-
Homeless Prenatal Program, Inc.	-	-	80,000
Hunter's Point Boys and Girls Club	30,000	20,000	-
Hunter's Point Community Youth Park Foundation	125,000	105,000	-
Independent Living Resource Center of SF	60,000	60,000	60,000
Ingleside Community Center	70,500	63,450	60,000
Inner City Youth	20,000	50,000	-
Iris Center	-	50,000	-
Jamestown Community Center	-	-	60,000
John W. King Senior Center	125,000	100,000	100,000
Juma Ventures	55,000	75,610	70,610
Larkin Street Youth Services	61,000	61,000	61,000
Lavender Youth Rec. & Info. Ct. (LYRIC)	80,000	66,000	65,000
Legal Assistance to the Elderly	30,000	30,000	30,000
Life Frames, Inc.	-	-	50,000
Literacy For Environmental Justice	19,000	-	-
Lutheran Church of Our Savior	34,000	59,900	-
Lyon-Martin Women's Health Services	77,500	77,500	77,500
Mission Education Projects, Inc.	65,000	50,000	37,500
National Community Development Institute	40,000	25,000	-
Network for Elders	58,000	63,000	50,000
New Leaf Services for our Community	55,000	55,000	55,000
Northeast Community Federal Credit Union	195,000	230,000	210,000
Northern California Community Loan Fund	40,000	40,000	-
Northern California Service League	68,000	68,000	66,000
Opnet Community Ventures, Inc.	50,000	100,000	-
Portola Family Connections	50,000	85,000	48,000
Positive Resource Center	-	95,000	-

Potrero Hill Neighborhood House	15,000	30,000	-
Positive Resource Center	115,000	-	90,000
Private Industry Council of SF	70,000	-	-
Providence Foundation	41,600	15,000	-
Rebuilding Together San Francisco	-	20,000	-
Recreation Center for the Handicapped	70,000	-	-
Renaissance Entrepreneurship Center	436,500	428,500	350,000
Renaissance Parents for Success	125,000	100,000	-
Richmond District Neighborhood Center	26,000	12,000	30,000
Sage Project	141,000	15,000	-
Samoan Community Development Center	60,000	60,000	60,000
San Francisco Child Abuse Prevention Center - Talk	32,500	32,500	30,000
SF Conservation Corps - Bernal Heights State Pre-School	-	-	44,845
SF Conservation Corps - Catholic Charities – Children’s Village	-	-	23,510
San Francisco Conservation Corps - Dr. Martin Luther King Childcare Center	-	50,000	-
San Francisco Conservation Corps - Noe Valley Co-op Nursery	-	55,000	-
San Francisco Conservation Corps - Rainbow Infant Center	-	64,000	-
San Francisco Conservation Corps - Sojourner Truth Child Care	-	40,000	54,544
SF Conservation Corps - Whitney Young CDC	-	-	34,592
San Francisco Foundation Community Initiative Funds/SFFSN	-	-	20,000
San Francisco Housing Development Corporation	-	250,000	100,000
San Francisco Lighthouse	-	-	25,000
San Francisco Parents Who Care	-	15,000	-
San Francisco Study Center	20,000	-	410,000
Somarts Cultural Center (w/ partners)	-	25,000	70,000
South of Market Foundation	100,000	100,000	100,000
Southwest Community Corporation	120,000	66,500	88,000
St. John’s Educational Thresholds Center	25,500	25,500	-
St. Vincent de Paul Society of San Francisco	45,000	45,000	45,000
Sunset District Comm. Development. Corporation	70,000	75,000	-
Sunset Youth Services	-	-	50,000
Swords to Ploughshares Veterans Rights Organization	40,000	40,000	40,000
Telegraph Hill Neighborhood Association	125,000	102,000	30,000

Tenderloin AIDS Resource Center	10,000	-	-
Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc.	87,500	87,500	87,500
Tenderloin Neighborhood Development Corporation	358,000	288,000	271,000
The Arc of San Francisco	-	175,000	-
The Janet Pomeroy Center	-	87,000	100,000
The Volunteer Center Serving San Francisco and San Mateo Counties	29,600	29,600	-
Tides Center	89,000	361,361	284,361
Together United Recommitted Forever (TURF)	15,000	50,000	50,000
Toolworks	47,000	47,000	56,085
United Council of Human Services	-	58,575	-
Urban Housing and Development Corporation	-	25,000	50,000
Urban Resource Systems	34,000	-	-
Urban University	-	50,000	50,000
URSA Institute	-	25,000	-
Visitacion Valley Community Center, Inc.	54,000	203,000	-
Visitacion Valley Community Development Corporation	271,000	266,000	-
Visitacion Valley JET	100,000	90,000	-
Walden House	-	-	16,000
Westside Community Services	-	45,000	30,000
Women's Foundation of California	-	85,000	35,000
Women's Initiative for Self Employment	100,000	100,000	100,000
YMCA of San Francisco - Chinatown	115,000	-	-
YMCA of San Francisco - Richmond	67,600	11,000	-
Young Community Developers	218,595	75,000	73,000
Total Funding, Non-immigrant CBOs	8,231,506	8,565,111	6,062,987

Source: Authors' calculations from CDBG data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (annual CAPER reports) for City and County of San Francisco.